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NOTES FROM THE EDITOR 
 
Dear readers, 
 
I am excited to present the fall 2018 issue of The Hilltop Review, which showcases the excellent 
research and creative work of graduate students at Western Michigan University. This issue 
contains a wide array of topics—from introversion to self-defense to religion’s influence on sexual 
affect—that reflect the diverse interests and projects of our academic community. The Hilltop 
Review aims not only to provide a platform for these projects, but to bring them into conversation 
with the work of graduate students across the University and beyond. Accomplishing this mission 
is not possible without strong submissions and attentive readers, and it is my hope that the Hilltop 
continues to find both in the future. 
 
The Hilltop offers several monetary awards in recognition of graduate student achievement. 
Congratulations to the winners of this issue’s awards! Ryan P. Castillo will receive $500 for the 
paper “There’s No ‘Me’ in ‘Imgur’: Applying SIDE Theory and Content Analysis to Viral Posts 
on Imgur.com;” Kirsten Welch will receive $250 for the paper “An Application of Risk Analysis 
to the Doctrine of Self-Defense;” and Brody Van Roekel will receive $150 for “The 
Christianization of Judith: Considering the Hieronymian Translation of Liber Iudith and Jerome’s 
Christianizing Agenda.” For creative work, Elizabeth R. Johnson will receive $250 for the 
photograph “Filter” and Steven J. Maloney will receive $250 for the poem “Autumn.” 
 
Throughout my first semester as the director and editor of the Hilltop, I have been fortunate to 
work alongside fellow students, faculty, and staff whose diligence and wisdom shaped the 
following issue. First, I would like to thank former editors Zahra Ameli Renani and Damon D. 
Chambers, along with GSA President Amaury Pineda, for helping me transition into this position. 
I am also grateful for the authors and artists who submitted their work, as well as the cast of peer 
reviewers who worked intently to secure outstanding research and creative work for publication. 
Special thanks to this issue’s Editorial Board: Andrew Bassford; Aneudy Mota Catalino; Damon 
D. Chambers; Diana Charnley; Alisa Heskin; and Marilyn Markel. Your prompt and insightful 
feedback was invaluable. Finally, I would like to thank Maira Bundza, our ScholarWorks 
Librarian, for assisting with our online publication and Dr. Charlie Kurth for his guidance in 
navigating the life of a journal. 
 
I look forward to working with authors and reviewers as we prepare for the spring issue of the 
Hilltop. The deadline to submit work or apply for the position of peer reviewer is February 3rd. 
Please email me at gsa-hilltop@wmich.edu with any questions about the submission or peer review 
process. Thank you for your interest and enjoy this issue. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Adam Waggoner 
Director and Editor, The Hilltop Review
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There’s No “Me” in “Imgur”: 
Applying SIDE Theory and 
Content Analysis to Viral Posts 
on Imgur.com 
 
Ryan P. Castillo 
 
Abstract 
 
The Social Identity model of Deindividuation Effects (SIDE) asserts that social 
(i.e., collective) identities are more salient under conditions of anonymity, 
prompting “deindividuation” as group members place more focus on community 
standards and downplay individual differences. As a result of deindividuation, 
social standards become the driving force of group interaction, and the successful 
practice of group norms identify individuals’ in-group status while reinforcing the 
social identity of the community. The current study applies the SIDE model to the 
anonymous image-sharing platform Imgur.com to ascertain whether self-referential 
posts are assessed more negatively than other-referential and non-directed content, 
and to examine whether posts of varying referential-type occur more frequently 
across post-type subcategories. A content analysis of 42 posts to Imgur’s “front 
page” revealed that self-referential posts receive significantly more “downvotes” 
(i.e., negative assessments) than non-directed content and substantially more 
downvotes compared to other-referential posts. Further, self-referential content was 
most common within the subcategories of “capitalizing” and “social support,” as 
compared to “community identification” and “information / mobilization” for 
other-referential, and “visually appealing” and “humor” for non-directed posts. The 
findings suggest that the Imgur community engages in voting habits that favor the 
maintenance of social identity over the sharing of individuating information, 
providing sustained support for the applicability of SIDE in anonymous online 
contexts such as Imgur. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Introduction and Literature Review 
 
Throughout the past several decades, the growing prominence of the 
Internet in everyday life has profoundly shaped the ways in which we communicate 
and assemble, consequently altering the means by which individuals draw upon 
available networks for social, emotional, and informational support. In addition to 
major online social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, an ever-growing 
expanse of niche virtual communities provides users with a wealth of opportunities 
for the formation and maintenance of interpersonal ties, both casual and intimate, 
including online dating sites, gaming communities, and image- and video-sharing 
platforms (Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe 2011; Kobayashi 2010; Maghrabi, 
Oakley, and Nemati 2014). Similar to popular social networking sites in terms of 
increasing popularity, communicative utility, and the extensive, heterogeneous 
user-bases of which they are composed, image-sharing platforms present fruitful 
and, to date, under-studied online arenas wherein users can contribute to, and self-
select into, a network of like-minded individuals (Hale 2017; Mikal et al. 2014). 
However, unlike dominant social media, image-sharing sites are most often 
anonymous in nature, an element of online interaction that not only stifles self-
presentation but raises questions regarding the determination of group membership 
in the absence of individuating information (Lea and Spears 1991; Postmes et al. 
2001). Given the scarcity of research examining group dynamics in anonymous 
online communities, the current study adopts the Social Identity model of 
Deindividuation Effects (SIDE) and applies content analysis to better understand 
the ways in which users of the image-sharing platform Imgur.com uphold a social 
(i.e., collective) identity through their assessment of shared-content.  
Imgur.com 
 Imgur.com is a popular image-sharing website that has been online since 
2009. Currently, the platform is ranked as the 13th most-visited site in the U.S., 
hosting over 250 million monthly-active users (i.e., Imgurians) who, in addition to 
casual visitors, account for billions of post views per month (Alexa 2018; 
Imgur.com 2018). Although Imgur may be broadly categorized as social media 
owing to users’ ability to share a wide-range of content (e.g., text, pictures, GIFs, 
hyperlinks, etc.), publicly respond to others’ posts, and send personal messages to 
other community members, Imgur differs from dominant social networking sites in 
two integral aspects: anonymity and bidirectional voting.  
Unlike, for instance, Facebook and Twitter, Imgurians are unlikely to share 
personal, identifying information over the platform and instead assume anonymous 
(and often humorous) usernames, such as “AFrustratedRetailStaffMember” and 
“PiggyStarDust.” Further, Imgurians are often admonished for sharing “selfies” 
(i.e., photos of oneself) over the platform, and it is widely-understood among the 
community that posting such pictures is only acceptable during major holidays, 
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particularly Christmas and Halloween. Regarding Imgur’s bidirectional voting 
system, users are able to either “upvote” (positively assess) or “downvote” 
(negatively assess) any content publicly-posted to the site, including both the posted 
content itself and individual comments on a given post. This bidirectional voting is 
in stark contrast to, say, Facebook’s “likes” and “reactions,” which do not allow 
users to explicitly assess content in an either positive or negative fashion. 
Importantly, Imgur’s bidirectional voting system is responsible for filtering posts 
through one of three daily-updated content galleries: “user-submitted” (recently 
submitted posts with few votes), “rising” (posts that are rising in popularity), and 
“most viral” (the most popular posts of the day). While all content publicly-posted 
to Imgur.com is archived and remains available unless otherwise removed by the 
original poster or site administrators, content that reaches the “front page” (i.e., 
“most viral” content) is most likely to be viewed by users and those casually visiting 
the site, though only Imgurians registered to the site are able to utilize the voting 
system.  
 In sum, Imgur constitutes an anonymous social media platform wherein the 
popularity of shared content is decided via a bidirectional voting system. The 
anonymous nature of the site, however, makes it difficult to determine exactly who 
comprises the Imgur community, and how users’ personal characteristics correlate 
with posting and voting behaviors. Yet, the few available studies examining group 
dynamics on Imgur.com suggest that a “common voice” exists among Imgurians, 
such that users exhibit “a generally cohesive tone, characterized by overall 
consistent responses, and overt behavior correction” (Mikal et al. 2014:506). 
Interestingly, previous research posits that anonymity is precisely the 
communicative element responsible for the occurrence of common voice on Imgur, 
with the lack of individuating information in tandem with the interactive structure 
of the site giving rise to standard communication practices that serve to solidify in-
group membership and strengthen social identity among users (Hale 2017; Mikal 
et al. 2014). Thus, regardless of whether objective, identifiable similarities or 
differences can be observed between individual Imgurians, a collective identity is 
likely upheld on Imgur.com, one that may be indicated by the posting and voting 
behaviors of its users.  
 
The SIDE Model 
 
The Social Identity model of Deindividuation Effects (SIDE) was 
developed as an alternative explanation to deindividuation, or “loss of self,” that 
has been meaningfully applied to computer-mediated interaction (Hale 2017; Lea 
and Spears 1991; Postmes et al. 2001). Whereas classical deindividuation theory 
posits that anonymity among group members causes a loss of self-awareness and 
identity, which leads to non-normative behavior, the SIDE model predicts that 
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anonymity is likely to result in group conformity (Spears and Lea 1994). The SIDE 
model hinges on the assumption that individuals balance multiple identities, 
including both individual personalities and social (or collective) identities. In 
keeping with identity theory, SIDE conceptualizes identity as internalized 
expectations for the social positions held by a given individual and contends that 
such internalizations are not only predictive of behavior, but that the probability of 
invoking a given identity (i.e., identity salience) is both contextually and 
interactively contingent (Lea and Spears 1991; Stryker and Burke 2000). Contrary 
to personal identity, which may be shaped by both psychological and contextual 
determinants, social identities are constructed and maintained in accordance with 
standards predetermined by a group of interest. Consequently, individuals who gain 
membership into a given group develop an understanding of group norms and 
construct a social identity that corresponds and conforms to the group dynamic 
(Stryker and Burke 2000). From the SIDE perspective, deindividuation occurs 
when a social identity becomes more salient than an individual identity under 
conditions of anonymity (Lea and Spears 1991). Not only does deindividuation 
downplay members’ personal motives and characteristics, but its effects prompt 
individuals to focus on group activities and social maintenance (Lea and Spears 
1991; Postmes et al. 2001). In other words, social norms become the driving force 
for group interaction, and the successful practice of group norms identifies an 
individual’s in-group status while reinforcing the social context and social identity 
of the group. 
 Previous research has demonstrated the applicability of SIDE in a variety 
of virtual settings, including social networking sites, online games, and image-
sharing sites such as Imgur.com (Attrill 2012; Hale 2017; Hughes and Louw 2013; 
Mikal et al. 2014). Studies of Imgur in particular suggest that the site not only 
facilitates deindividuation via users’ anonymity, but that this process is evidenced 
by the communication of, and adherence to, community standards in comments and 
posted content (Hale 2017; Mikal et al. 2014). Mikal et al. (2014) refers to these 
posting and commenting practices as “common voice,” and found that users 
respond to posts using formulaic language, such as common terms, repetitious 
jokes, and references to previously posted content. Further, Mikal et al. (2014) 
found that both posts and comments exhibiting features of common voice are 
rewarded with “upvotes” and positive feedback, suggesting that users expect other 
Imgurians to understand specific types of responses and intend to capitalize on 
references to a shared culture. Findings from Hale’s (2017) study of commenting 
practices on Imgur both support and extend Mikal et al.’s (2014) research, showing 
that comments conveying disapproval/disagreement with content featured on the 
front page of the site are more likely to be sanctioned with “downvotes,” and that 
common voice is most evident across particular post categories, including 
“community identification,” “capitalizing,” and “humor.”  
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Taken together, the findings from previous research suggest that users of 
Imgur.com actively maintain a social identity through the use of group-centered 
language and the sanctioning of content and comments that fail to reflect shared 
community standards, ultimately providing strong evidence for the applicability of 
the SIDE model to this platform. However, although past studies have successfully 
categorized posts and examined the differential reception of content and comments 
that are in accordance with a “common voice” upheld by the community, research 
has yet to examine whether posts are assessed differently according to whether the 
content explicitly references the original poster rather than the community at large 
or no one in particular. In other words, how do Imgurians react to self-referential 
information under the effects of deindividuation? The following research questions 
and expectations are posed, and subsequently explored through a content analysis 
of posts on Imgur.com: 
 
RQ1: Are self-referential, other-referential, and non-directed posts assessed 
differently by the Imgur community? 
H1: Self-referential posts will be assessed more negatively by the 
Imgur community than both other-referential and non-directed 
content.  
RQ2: Do referential-types vary across post-type subcategories? 
 
Method 
 
Sampling 
 
Because the aim of the current study involves comparing self-referential, 
other-referential, and non-directed posts in terms of their relative level of 
acceptance by the Imgur community, a constructed week sampling strategy with 
elements of stratification was employed. Constructed week sampling was chosen 
to avoid potential bias toward posts submitted on certain days of the week or during 
significant events, while stratification was incorporated in order to ensure that posts 
of each referential-type were represented in the sample. The sampling frame for 
this study encompassed a six month period, from December 1st, 2017 through May 
30th, 2018. Each day of the week (Monday through Sunday) was selected at random 
from the frame to create one constructed week. Once the days were selected, two 
posts of each referential-type were purposively chosen from the “gallery” (i.e., 
archived posts) for each randomly chosen day (see below for how posts were coded 
into referential subcategories). This sampling strategy resulted in a total of 42 posts 
to be analyzed.  
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Coding  
 
To test the hypothesis, two a priori categories were developed and used to 
code each post: reference-type and negative assessment (i.e., level of acceptance). 
Additionally, a third category, post-type, was adapted from previous studies of 
Imgur content. To assess intra-coder reliability for both nominal categories in the 
current study (reference- and post-type), the analyst re-coded the sampled posts 
four days after the initial coding and a percentage of agreement was calculated for 
each category; these percentages are reported below.  
As previously mentioned, the reference-type category (percentage of 
agreement = 100%) includes three subcategories: self-referential, other-referential, 
and non-directed. Although content submitted to Imgur.com may incorporate any 
combination of images, GIFs (i.e., animated images), and text, posts were coded 
into the reference-type subcategories based only on text contained in the post title 
or description, since these aspects of posted content are intended for users to 
explicitly state the subject/purpose of the post and direct viewers’ attention to 
particular elements of the post. Thus, the coding unit for this category was the entire 
post, while the context unit was the text contained therein (i.e., post titles and 
descriptions). Posts were coded as self-referential if either the title or description 
made explicit reference to the original poster (OP). References made by the OP to 
him- or herself were indicated either by the use of a first-person personal pronoun 
(e.g., I, me, my, mine) or popular acronyms that include personal pronouns, such 
as “MRW” (“my reaction when”) or “TIL” (today I learned). Conversely, posts 
were coded as other-referential if either the post title or description included a 
second- (i.e., you, your, yours) or third-person pronoun (e.g., he she, they, them), 
or made use of a first-person plural pronoun (e.g., us, we, ours). Non-directed posts 
were those that made no explicit reference to the OP or other individuals/groups 
within the post title/description. Table 1 below shows several examples of post titles 
and descriptions used to code posts by reference-type.  
 
Table 1.  Examples of Post Titles/Descriptions Coded for Reference-Type. 
Reference-Type Example 
Self-referential “Had one of those I hate my job days, 
then I read this…” (title) 
 
“Why I don’t take selfies” (title) 
 “My first and last selfie.” (description) 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
Other-referential “Because you asked for it..” 
(title/description) 
 
“Some weird-ass music videos for you 
freaks in usersub” (title) 
Non-directed “Expect the unexpected” (title) 
 
“Santa made out of chocolate” (title) 
 
“Danny DeVit..OHHHH” (title) 
 
Because posts were sampled from Imgur’s “most viral” page for each day 
selected into the constructed week, incorporating upvotes into a measure assessing 
relative acceptance would not be expected to yield meaningful results. In other 
words, the posts sampled in the current study had already been well-received by the 
Imgur community and, for this reason, the relative acceptance of each post was best 
indicated by how poorly it was received when compared to other “viral” content. 
Thus, rather than “level of acceptance”, the category negative assessment was 
measured by calculating the number of downvotes per 1,000 views. No percentage 
of agreement was calculated for this category given the objective values used to 
compute negative assessment scores.  
 In addition to the two categories developed for the purposes of this study, a 
third category, post-type (percentage of agreement = 95.23%), was adapted from 
previous content analyses of Imgur postings (Hale 2017; Mikal et al. 2014). Mikal 
et al. (2014) identified six categories under which content posted to Imgur can be 
coded, including: community identification (inside jokes, popular interests, 
community policing, shared experience), social support (social support, 
confessions), capitalizing (positive experience, original art), humor (general 
humor), visually appealing, and information / mobilization. However, in the current 
study, rather than treating each of these as separate categories and allowing for 
cross-coding of Imgur content under two or more of these types, each of Mikal et 
al.’s (2014) original categories were treated as subcategories of post-type in order 
to maintain mutual exclusivity. The coding unit for this category was the entire post 
and, to code for post-type, all content contained in each post was taken as the unit 
of context; in other words, unlike the reference-type category, the post title, 
description, and body (i.e., pictures, GIFs, etc.) were used to categorize the posts. 
In considering the graphical displays when coding into the post-type subcategories, 
each image/GIF was scanned for indicators that could be reasonably subsumed 
under one of the six headings. For example, a GIF of a wide-eyed dog stumbling 
around a living room under the heading “Morphine is a hell of a drug” was 
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understood as an attempt at humoring the Imgur community. On the other hand, a 
post titled “Achieved my 3-year goal” showing a before-and-after picture of a man 
who had lost a significant amount of weight clearly reflects a positive experience 
that, consequently, would be coded under the “capitalizing” subcategory. In cases 
where categorization was not as obvious, such as a GIF of a bee being offered a 
small amount of liquid through a straw with the heading “Giving a bee sugar water 
on a hot day,” the post descriptions were helpful in coming to a coding decision; in 
this case, while the post might have been considered either “information / 
mobilization” (by showing how to feed a bee sugar water) or “capitalizing” (by 
depicting the positive experience of saving the bee), the caption stating “video 
credit: the bee rescuer is Reddit [user] BadBoiJackson” led to the decision to code 
the post as the latter, with use of the term “rescuer” indicating someone’s 
(BadBoiJackson’s) positive experience. Figure 1 below presents an example of how 
post titles, descriptions, and graphical content were used to code posts into each 
post-type subcategory.  
 
Title: “A going away gift from one of the staff. Please help me embarrass him by 
making him internet famous.” 
 
Description: “I just left my employment to move to Brazil. My staff gave me an 
amazing going away party. This wonderful gem was given to me on my last day. 
Not only will it haunt my dreams, but I don’t think I will be able to achieve an 
erection ever again. Please help me repay him by making him internet famous.” 
Figure 1.  Example of Post Coded as “Information / Mobilization”. 
Note: underlined words taken as indicators of the post-type subcategory 
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Results 
 
In total, 14 posts of each referential-type were coded, resulting in a total of 
42 posts analyzed. Descriptive statistics for post-type, referential-type by post-type, 
and negative assessment are shown in Figures 2 and 3, and Table 2, respectively. 
As shown below, the most common post-type subcategory was “humor” (n = 19, 
45.2%), followed by “capitalizing” (n = 8, 19%), “community identification” (n = 
5, 11.9%) and “information / mobilization” (11.9%), “visually appealing” (n = 4, 
9.5%), and “social support” (n = 1, 2.4%). Non-directed posts were the most 
common within both the “humor” (n = 8) and “visually appealing (n = 3) 
subcategories, occurred less frequently under “capitalizing” (n = 2) and 
“information / mobilization” (n = 1), and were not observed within the “community 
identification” and “social support” subcategories. Self-referential posts were the 
most frequent within the “capitalizing” subcategory (n = 5), the second most 
commonly occurring under both “humor” (n = 6) and “community identification” 
(n = 2), and were the only referential-type to occur within the “social support” 
subcategory (n = 1); no self-referential posts were coded as either “visually 
appealing” or “information / mobilization.” Finally, other-referential was the most 
commonly coded reference-type within the “community identification” (n = 3) and 
“information / mobilization” (n = 4) subcategories, occurred frequently under 
“humor” (n = 5), and was the least common within the “capitalizing” (n = 1) and 
“visually appealing” (n = 1) subcategories; no other-referential posts were coded as 
“social support.”   
Figure 2.  Post Type Frequencies. 
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Figure 3.  Post Type by Referential Type.  
 
Regarding negative assessment, self-referential posts received the highest 
number of downvotes per 1,000 views (.760), followed by other-referential (.541), 
and non-directed posts (.365), lending support to the research expectation (see 
Table 2 below). The difference in the mean number of downvotes per 1,000 views 
was statistically significant between self-referential and non-directed posts (t = 
3.349, p < .01), lending additional support to the hypothesis; as an aside, a 
significant difference was also observed between other-referential and non-directed 
content (t = 1.746, p < .10). However, no significant difference was found between 
self- and other-referential posts with regards to negative assessment, though this 
difference approached statistical significance (p = .105); it is likely that this 
nonsignificant finding can be attributed to the considerably small sample size in the 
current study (n = 42). A two-way ANOVA did not reveal any significant 
interaction effects among the reference- and post-type categories on the downvote 
rate. Overall, then, the findings regarding negative assessment support the research 
expectation that self-referential posts are assessed more negatively by the Imgur 
community.  
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Table 2.  Mean Downvotes per 1,000 Views (Negative Assessment) for 
Referential- and Post-Type Subcategories. 
Category Mean Downvotes per 1,000 Views 
(SD) 
Referential-Type 
Self-referential 
Other-referential 
Non-directed 
 
Post-Type 
Humor 
Capitalizing 
Community Identification 
Information / Mobilization 
Visually Appealing 
Social Support 
 
.760 (.38) 
.541 (.31) 
.365 (.22) 
 
 
.562 (.39) 
.692 (.35) 
.446 (.18) 
.556 (.20) 
.255 (.20) 
1.10 
Note: The post type subcategory “social support” has a frequency of one and, thus, no standard 
deviation. For each referential type subcategory, n= 14.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 Overall, the findings from this study lend support to the applicability of 
SIDE in anonymous online contexts and add to the scarce body of knowledge 
regarding how deindividuation operates on Imgur.com. Self-referential posts were 
found to have a significantly higher number of downvotes per 1,000 views than 
non-directed posts, with the difference approaching statistical significance when 
compared to other-referential content, lending support to the research expectation 
and suggesting that Imgurians perceive individuating information more negatively 
within the anonymous online context of the site. Notably, posts categorized as 
“visually appealing” and “community identification,” which were most commonly 
of a non-directed and other-referential nature, respectively, had the lowest rate of 
downvotes among the post-type subcategories. Conversely, posts categorized as 
“capitalizing” and “social support,” which were most often of a self-referential 
nature, received the most downvotes per 1,000 views. The difference in the mean 
number of downvotes per 1,000 views across the post-type subcategories, however, 
may simply be due to the higher number of self-referential, other-referential, and 
non-directed posts falling under each post-type rather than any practically 
important interaction effect, as evidenced by the nonsignificant results from the 
two-way ANOVA conducted in the analysis. 
In conclusion, the findings from this study suggest that deindividuation is 
facilitated on Imgur and, due to the salience of a social identity which is valued and 
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upheld on the site, self-referential content that highlights individuating information 
is more likely to be sanctioned by community members than other-referential and 
non-directed posts. These findings not only support past studies of the platform 
(Hale 2017; Mikal et al. 2014), but further elucidate the communicative and 
behavioral mechanisms that reinforce in-group status, group standards, and 
collective identity in anonymous online contexts. The current study, however, is 
not without its limitations. First, the considerably small sample of posts may have 
led to nonsignificant findings that would have reached statistical significance given 
an adequate sample size. For this reason, the findings from this study should not be 
considered generalizable to the entire platform and future studies should strive for 
substantially larger samples. Second, selection of posts from Imgur’s “front page” 
may pose issues of sampling bias in favor of well-received posts. Although the 
current study addresses this issue by comparing posts based on downvotes per 1,000 
views (i.e., relative negative assessment), future studies should seek to sample from 
the “user-submitted” and “rising” galleries to ascertain whether differences in 
reception exist at various stages of the “virality” process. Finally, while mutual 
exclusivity is a necessary condition of quantitative content analyses, the current 
research design did not permit cross-coding into multiple subcategories, a 
constraint which may detract from the nuance and complexity of content posted to 
Imgur.com and, thereby, the exhaustiveness of the coding scheme. For this reason, 
future studies should carefully weigh the relative benefits of mutual exclusivity and 
exhaustiveness when constructing or adapting the categories into which content is 
coded.  
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An Application of Risk Analysis 
to the Doctrine of Self-Defense 
 
Kirsten Welch 
 
Abstract 
 
Although it is an unavoidable aspect of any self-defense situation, risk is an 
underdeveloped concept in the self-defense literature. In this paper, I argue that the 
existence of objective risk can justify the use of self-defense, even in cases in which 
defensive action is not clearly necessary. To accomplish this, I first introduce the 
concept of risk, seeking a definition that incorporates both objective and subjective 
elements in a manner appropriate to a discussion of self-defense. In section two, I 
make a case for the appropriate way to carry out and apply risk analysis in self-
defense situations, addressing questions of perspective, types of threats, and 
availability of alternatives to the use of defense of force. Based on this discussion, 
I will suggest that it is unjust to require a person to take on extra risk when that risk 
can be transferred to the person responsible for the creation of the risk. In section 
three, I discuss some significant implications the consideration of risk as suggested 
by my analysis has for current approaches to self-defense doctrine. Most 
importantly, my analysis indicates that self-defense can be justified even if using 
violent force against an aggressor is not strictly necessary. 
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Consider the following two scenarios: 
 
Case 1:  Dr. Maleficus, an evil scientist, has forced Bill into a game of Russian 
roulette.  Dr. Maleficus, being the brilliant scientist that he is, has created a gun 
that is bigger on the inside and has a thousand chambers, only one of which actually 
contains a bullet.  Dr. Maleficus is about to pull the trigger.  May Bill kill him in 
self-defense?1 
 
Case 2:  Westley has been captured by the Dread Pirate Roberts, who has the 
reputation of killing all his hostages without mercy.  The Dread Pirate Roberts, 
however, being in an amiable frame of mind, has decided to let Westley live one 
more night.  Before retiring, he says, “Good night, Westley.  Sleep tight.  I’ll most 
likely kill you in the morning.”  During the night, Westley discovers that his door 
is unlocked and that the Dread Pirate Roberts carelessly left his sword lying on the 
deck.  May Westley kill the Dread Pirate Roberts in self-defense?2 
 
Does Bill or Westley have a higher chance of dying if he does not choose to act in 
self-defense?  We do not have an exact numerical probability by which to estimate the 
chances that the Dread Pirate Roberts will kill Westley in the morning, but it is probably 
safe to assume that the probability is higher—indeed, significantly higher—than the one in 
one thousand chance of dying that Bill faces.  Arguably, then, if Bill should be able to act 
in self-defense in Case 1, Westley should be able to act in self-defense in Case 2, given his 
chance of dying is much greater than Bill’s.  The problem, though, is that current self-
defense doctrine as employed in many jurisdictions demands a different evaluation:  
according to the rule of self-defense, Bill may kill Dr. Maleficus, but Westley may not kill 
the Dread Pirate Roberts in self-defense.  
In this paper, I will make the case for the claim that Westley should be able to 
employ self-defense against the Dread Pirate Roberts.  In doing so, I will focus my 
discussion on a concept that has so far been underdeveloped in the self-defense literature: 
the concept of risk.  I will argue that the existence of objective risk can justify the use of 
self-defense, even in cases in which the possibility of death or serious injury is not 
imminent and situations in which defensive action is not clearly necessary.  To accomplish 
                                                          
1 Russian roulette cases crop up frequently in the self-defense literature.  For an example of how a 
Russian roulette case can contribute to constructing a theory of self-defense, see Kimberly Kessler 
Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” Law and Philosophy 24 (2005):  711-749.  
2 This case, in its essential features, is a slightly more theatrical version of Paul Robinson’s hostage 
scenario.  See Paul Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses 2 (St. Paul:  West Publishing Co., 1984):  77.  
Note that one way to accommodate the intuition that the hostage character should be able to act in 
self-defense in these sorts of cases is to claim that self-defense is being employed not directly against 
the threat of future death but rather against the ongoing harm resulting from loss of freedom and 
violation of rights.  For this sort of response, see Onder Bakircioglu, “The Contours of the Right to 
Self-Defense:  Is the Requirement of Imminence Merely a Translator for the Concept of Necessity?” 
Journal of Criminal Law 72 (2008):  161.  Whether or not Bakircioglu is correct in his analysis, for 
the purposes of this paper I believe we can safely disregard this objection, as some real-life cases I 
will examine later on will make it clear this sort of analysis does not always solve the problem.  
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this, I will first introduce the concept of risk, highlighting the epistemic difficulties inherent 
in self-defense situations.  In section two, I will make a case for the appropriate way to 
carry out and apply risk analysis in self-defense situations, suggesting a person should not 
be required to take on extra unjust risk when that risk can be transferred to the person 
culpable for the creation of the risk.  In section three, I will discuss some significant 
implications the consideration of risk as suggested by my analysis has for current 
approaches to self-defense doctrine.  
 
1. What is Risk? 
 
Risk is most simply understood as a probability of harm.3  When we engage in 
risky behavior, we understand we are creating the chance that a certain negative outcome 
will materialize as a result of our conduct.4  Thus, in order to understand risk, we need to 
grasp its two main constituent concepts:  probability and harm.5  For the purposes of this 
project, we can treat harm as a fairly straightforward idea:  anything that serves to provide 
a setback to a person’s interests can count as a harm.6  Probability is quite a bit more 
complicated.  We need to distinguish between two different types of probability, and hence 
two different approaches to the notion of risk.   
Probability can be objective or epistemic.  A common way of describing objective 
probability is the use of relative frequencies.  On this view, the probability that an event 
will occur is determined by the rate at which the event occurs in similar situations.7  This 
frequency is simply an objective fact about the world, independent of whether anybody can 
come to know that fact.  On the other hand, epistemic conceptions of probability appeal to 
at least some degree of subjectivity when making probability assessments.  Epistemic 
conceptions of probability fall on an objective/subjective spectrum, and the view of 
epistemic probability with which we will be concerned for this project combines objective 
and subjective elements.  This view is what Stephen Perry calls the “reasonableness 
account” of epistemic probability, and he claims this account is grounded in two 
fundamental assumptions:  first, relative frequencies as hypothesized by the purely 
                                                          
3 John Oberdiek, “Towards a Right Against Risking,” Law and Philosophy 28 (2009): 369.   
4 Stephen R. Perry, “Risk, Harm, and Responsibility,” in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, 
ed. David Owen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 322.   
5 Id. 
6 This definition comes from Stephen Perry, id.  Interestingly, on this definition, it seems that risk 
itself could be a harm, as being forced to live with risk could be a setback to a person’s interests on 
many levels.  Some scholars have made arguments that risk itself is a harm along these lines:  for 
an argument based on the negative value of risk, see Vera Bergelson, “Self-Defense and Risks,” in 
The Ethics of Self-Defense, ed. Christian Coons and Michael Weber (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2016):  134-135; for an argument grounded in the concept of autonomy, see Oberdiek, 
“Towards a Right Against Risking,” 367-392; for an argument centered on the claim that risk makes 
a person worse-off than he would have been otherwise, see Claire Finkelstein, “Is Risk a Harm?”  
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151 (2003):  963-1001.  If risk itself is a harm, this assertion 
might further support the claim that the existence of risk can legitimize the use of self-defense.  This 
is a controversial stance, however, and so I will not make use of it in my own argument.   
7 Perry, “Risk, Harm, and Responsibility,” 323. 
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objective account really do exist;  second, people are capable of estimating those 
frequencies.8  Thus, the reasonableness account of epistemic probability incorporates the 
objectivity of relative frequencies and a subjective assessment supported by those relative 
frequencies.   
When applying these two conceptions of probability to the concept of risk, it 
becomes clear that we can approach our analysis of risk in two different ways.  If we make 
use of the purely objective account of probability, then risk is a relative frequency 
calculated by the function of the number of times the risk is manifested in actual harm 
divided by the total number of relevantly similar situations.  An epistemic conception of 
probability, on the other hand, will yield a conception of risk in which risk is a subjective 
estimation of the chance the harm threatened by the risk will come to fruition.  Using a 
purely subjective epistemic account, risk is nothing more than what the person at risk 
believes it to be, but the reasonableness account of epistemic risk leads to a subjective but 
evidence-driven estimation of the relative frequencies posited by the objective view.  
For the purposes of this project, we will be concerned with the reasonableness 
account of epistemic risk.  Both the purely subjective epistemic version and the purely 
objective version include pitfalls that significantly undermine the concerns of the self-
defense doctrine under consideration.  When working with a purely subjective conception 
of risk, the chance the harm will materialize is divorced from reality.  On the other hand, it 
seems questionable that we could ever achieve a useful assessment of risk that is purely 
objective—indeed, the very process of a person assessing the probability that a harm will 
materialize necessitates the inclusion of a subjective element.9   
 
2. Assessing Risk for Self-Defense 
 
Now that we have a grasp of the main features of risk, we can apply this concept 
to the theory of self-defense.  An essential feature of self-defense situations is that, given 
our epistemic limitations, these situations always involve a certain degree of uncertainty, 
some more so than others.10  We can never be sure whether self-defense is truly necessary 
or not.11  As a result, every case of self-defense demands an evaluation of risk.  Given this, 
                                                          
8 Id.  at 325. 
9 Claire Finkelstein argues we do not ever have access to truly objective probabilities:  “[T]here is 
no such thing as an objective probability.  There are only degrees of belief or confidence about the 
likelihood of a certain event occurring … Thus although an agent’s degree of belief will be based 
on real observations he can make, likelihoods cannot be a matter of objective facts.”  Finkelstein, 
“Is Risk a Harm?”  973.  Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan support a similar view. 
claiming that “objective probabilities are illusory.”  See Alexander and Ferzan, Crime and 
Culpability:  A Theory of Criminal Law (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2009):  31.  
10 As Larry Alexander observes with respect to self-defense, “Only God can see the future with 
absolute certainty.”  Larry Alexander, “A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection.”  Notre 
Dame Law Review 74 (1999):  1478.  Because we cannot see the future, self-defense is always 
preemptive, and as a result, uncertainty will always be present to some degree.  See Bergelson, 
“Self-Defense and Risks,” 132. 
11 This surety goes for the defender at the moment of self-defense as well as for the court after self-
defense has taken place.  In fact, the only situations in which it seems we can be sure that self-
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it might seem surprising that risk has received relatively little attention within the context 
of self-defense.12   
 In section one, I explained the conception of risk this project will be utilizing.  This 
explanation gives us a structure with which to proceed, but it does not tell us how we ought 
to go about assessing the level of risk present in a scenario on a practical level or how that 
risk should be employed when thinking about situations of self-defense.13  From what 
perspective should we assess risk?  What sort of threats should we take into account when 
estimating the level of risk?  To what degree should we take into consideration alternatives 
that might allow the potential victim to dispel the risk?  I will address each of these three 
questions in turn. 
 
2.1 Perspective  
 
I endorsed the “reasonableness” account of epistemic risk for two reasons:  first, 
because it maintains a tie to objectivity in that it attempts to estimate accurately the 
important relative frequencies; second, because it recognizes the fact that whenever a 
person carries out a risk evaluation, that evaluation will be conducted from a certain 
perspective.  The question at hand, then, is what perspective is the appropriate one to 
consider in self-defense scenarios.  I want to evaluate three possible answers to this 
question, rejecting two and tentatively accepting the other.  I will not consider the 
perspective of the aggressor, because considering this perspective ceases to assign meaning 
to the concept of risk in the first place:  since the aggressor is in control of the situation, 
from his perspective the risk to the victim will essentially be either 100% or 0%, depending 
on whether or not he truly intends to kill.14  
First, consider the perspective of the defender.  In most situations, it seems that the 
defender will form a belief that he is at risk based on the presence of certain behaviors or 
threats manifested on the part of the aggressor.  In other words, the defender’s belief that 
he is at risk will not come out of thin air.  But is this belief enough?  Even if the defender 
forms his belief based on evidence that he is at risk, it seems that in many situations, such 
a belief will also be influenced—in fact, perhaps influenced even more greatly—by 
subjective factors such as fear or hate.15  Human beings are emotional creatures, and as 
                                                          
defense was necessary are situations in which the potential defender chose not to use self-defense 
and was afterwards killed by the aggressor. 
12 Bergelson observes that “the current law of self-defense seems to ignore the degree of risk that 
the target of an offense may be actually hurt.”  Bergelson, “Self-Defense and Risks,” 141. 
13 Ferzan addresses this question, concluding the perspective of the defender is the only appropriate 
starting point from which to assess the risk present in a self-defense situation.  See Ferzan, 
“Justifying Self-Defense,” 739-748.  
14 I suppose it could be argued that the aggressor cannot know if he is about to suffer a fatal heart 
attack in the five seconds before he intends to pull the trigger, but I think that we can safely ignore 
this sort of objection here. 
15 People who have been under a great deal of stress or have dealt with abuse for a significant amount 
of time might be especially likely to estimate risk based on their subjective fears rather than objective 
evidence.  For a discussion of how chronic pressure can affect people’s judgment, see Richard 
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such, we are radically subject to distorted perceptions of reality.  A potential defender will 
probably be able to discern that he is facing some sort of threat, but he might not be able 
to evaluate accurately the nature and degree of the riskiness in his situation.  For this reason, 
I believe that making the defender’s perspective the only one we take into consideration 
when evaluating risk is implausible.16 
 Next, consider the perspective of a “reasonable” defender.  The “reasonable 
person” standard is incredibly muddled, and it seems no one really knows what it is 
supposed to mean.17  For this project, though, consider the following scenario and the 
meaning of ‘reasonable’ it entails: 
 
Vulcan Bob has been incarcerated in a human prison for obnoxious theorizing.  As 
is typical of a Vulcan, Vulcan Bob is extremely rational:  his emotions do not lead 
him astray in his decision-making processes, and he is capable of accurately 
evaluating the probable outcomes of many situations.  Unfortunately, Vulcan Bob 
has been placed in a cell with another prisoner, Evil Joe, who has a reputation for 
sexually abusing his cellmates – especially those with strangely shaped ears.  
Within the first day in the cell, Evil Joe begins to threaten to rape Vulcan Bob in 
the middle of the night.  Vulcan Bob evaluates the risk he faces and calculates that 
there is (roughly) a 90% chance that Evil Joe will actually attempt to rape him 
within the next week.   
 
In this scenario, Vulcan Bob is still assessing the risk from a subjective perspective; that 
is, he is assessing it based on the access he has to the evidence that he is indeed at risk.  
However, Vulcan Bob is assessing risk purely based on the objective data about this 
particular situation.18 
 The sort of risk assessment in which Vulcan Bob engages would probably be an 
excellent standard by which to evaluate risk.  It is objective in that it is concerned with the 
available evidence, and it is subjective in that it is still conducted from a limited epistemic 
                                                          
Lippke, “Chronic Temptation, Reasonable Firmness, and the Criminal Law,” Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 34, no. 1 (2014):  75-96.  
16 Ferzan accepts the perspective of the defender as the proper perspective for assessing risk.  
However, she does so only after establishing that what she calls “objective triggering conditions” 
exist in the particular situation.  On her view, once objective triggering conditions have been 
established, any possibility of risk is enough to merit self-defense on the part of the potential victim; 
as a result, it does not significantly matter whether or not the victim’s perceptions are being distorted 
by emotional factors.  My project is slightly different, in that I want to determine the correct 
perspective from which to decide whether the triggering conditions in fact create risk.  For Ferzan’s 
discussion of triggering conditions, see Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” 733-738. 
17 For a brief overview of some of the approaches to the “reasonable person” and a discussion of the 
problems associated with the vagueness of the standard, see Andrew Ingram, “Parsing the 
Reasonable Person:  The Case of Self-Defense,” American Journal of Criminal Law 39 (2012):  
430-433. 
18 For an argument in support of this sort of approach, see Michael J. Zimmerman, Living with 
Uncertainty:  The Moral Significance of Ignorance (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
2008):  ix-xi, 97-117.  Vera Bergelson rejects this approach for practical reasons similar to mine:  
see Vera Bergelson, “Self-Defense and Risks,” 137.   
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perspective.  I believe, however, that this approach to risk assessment is also implausible, 
mainly because it is, arguably, impossible.  No one, whether the defender or a third party, 
will be able to assess truly impartially the risk associated with an isolated situation.  
Vulcans, in real life, do not exist. 
 Finally, I want to consider the third-party perspective.  Vera Bergelson argues for 
the use of what she calls a “contemporaneous objective standard” when evaluating the 
degree of risk present in a situation.19  The key question for this approach is this:  “What is 
the likelihood that, in the ordinary course of things, this risk will materialize?”20  This 
approach combines both objective and subjective elements in a way that seems to fit well 
with the purpose of the self-defense doctrine.  On the one hand, it accounts for the limited 
epistemic perspective of the person assessing the risk, as such a person must try to answer 
the key question based on whatever evidence he has about the situation, and similar 
situations, at that time.  It also recognizes the difficulty of precisely assessing the degree 
of risk when human agents are involved.21  On the other hand, it makes use of the concept 
of relative frequency by use of the notion of “the ordinary course of things.”22  Despite our 
limited epistemic perspective, we can still access statistical information that will help us 
estimate the likelihood that a risk will come to fruition.23  
 There is an objection to this approach that is worth considering.  The 
contemporaneous objective standard demands that we compare the current situation with 
other similar scenarios.  The problematic question is as follows:  what counts as the set of 
similar scenarios?  This question is a generality problem, a problem of reference class.  It 
seems we could infinitely redraw the relevant reference class by specifying different levels 
                                                          
19 Bergelson, “Self-Defense and Risk,” 137. 
20 Id.  Note also that either the defender or the trier of fact could ask this question, but doing so 
would involve a detached, third party perspective in either case.   
21 This is the case even in instances of Russian roulette, when we can calculate some portion of the 
probability with complete precision.  If we know how many chambers the gun has and how many 
bullets are in the chambers, then we can calculate the exact probability that the victim will be killed 
if the gun is fired.  But it does not tell us anything about the probability that the gun will, in fact, be 
fired:  “To be clear, this approach does not allow for the precise calculation, mainly because of the 
difficulty in predicting the choice of a free moral agent, particularly the choice to act wrongfully; 
however, it gives us at least a general sense of high and low probability and it does so from the 
objective perspective required by the justificatory nature of self-defense.”  Id. at 137-138.    
22 The phrase, “in the ordinary course of things,” is, admittedly, a bit vague.  A comment in Roy v. 
U.S. clarifies what Bergelson means by this phrase in the context of the contemporaneous objective 
standard: “The phrase “in the ordinary course of things” refers to what may reasonably ensue from 
the planned events, not to what might conceivably happen, and in particular suggests the absence of 
intervening factors.”  Roy v. U.S., 652 A. 2d 1098, 1105 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995). 
23 Christopher Schroeder suggests that statistical evaluation, when applied to a large enough sample, 
can give us an excellent estimate of the chance that risky behavior will result in harm:  “Once the 
probability of harm associated with a risky action can be gauged, an axiom of statistical theory holds 
that a sufficient number of repetitions of that action practically guarantees that the harm actually 
will occur.”  See Christopher Schroeder, “Rights against Risks,” Columbia Law Review 86 (1986):  
500.  Given the difficulty of predicting the behavior of human agents, this claim might be overly 
optimistic, but it seems that statistical information certainty can help us make accurate estimations 
of risk.  
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of generality for the similarity requirement. 24  To illustrate this problem, at this point it 
will be helpful to introduce a few real-life cases that will continue to form a basis for this 
discussion.  These cases are all concerned with threats of death or serious bodily harm in 
prison contexts.25 
 
State v. Schroeder:  Schroeder shared a cell with Riggs, who had a reputation for 
violence and forcing sex upon fellow inmates.  For a while, Riggs had been 
coercing Schroeder into gambling with him, and, as a result, Schroeder owed Riggs 
a large debt, which Riggs had been threatening to collect in the form of homosexual 
favors.  On the night in question, before going to sleep, Riggs said that he might 
“collect some of this money I got owed me tonight.”  While Riggs was asleep, 
Schroeder stabbed him in the back with a table knife.26 
  
U.S. v. Haynes: Haynes, an inmate at a federal prison, was convicted of assault 
after he poured scalding oil on the head of a fellow inmate, Nelson Flores-Pedroso, 
while Flores-Pedroso was sitting in the prison cafeteria.  Flores-Pedroso had a 
reputation for coercing weaker inmates, and for about a month prior to this assault, 
Flores-Pedroso had been threatening Haynes with forced homosexual acts if 
Haynes did not use his position as a member of the food preparation staff in the 
kitchen to do favors for Flores-Pedroso.27   
 
U.S. v. Bello:  Bello, an inmate who was working in the food line at the prison 
cafeteria, denied second helpings to the victim Santana-Rosa as not all the 
prisoners had been served yet.  Santana told Bello that he was going to “crack open 
[Bello’s] head,” and after the meal was over another inmate came up and told Bello 
                                                          
24 John Oberdiek observes that if we can infinitely redraw the reference class and have no guidelines 
as to how to specify the correct reference class, an objective account of probability becomes every 
bit as indeterminate as a subjective account.  See Oberdiek, “Towards a Right Against Risking,” 
368.  
25 It is worth noting that the question of whether prison inmates should be able to plead self-defense 
at all has been answered in different ways.  A negative answer to the question might be motivated 
by the intuition that, as prison inmates are responsible for ending up in prison in the first place, they 
are indirectly responsible for the threat that motivates acting in self-defense.  As a result, they should 
not be able to plead self-defense at all.  For example, in Rowe v. Debruyn, Rowe was denied self-
defense as a complete defense by prison officials at a disciplinary hearing after having been involved 
in a brawl with another inmate, Michael Evans.  Evans, who occupied the cell next to Rowe, made 
sexual demands upon Rowe, and the morning after making these demands, Evans entered Rowe’s 
cell and attempted to rape him.  Rowe responded by striking Evans on the head with a pot.  The 
circuit court held that the prison officials did not violate Rowe’s due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment by not allowing him to plead self-defense as a complete defense.  See Rowe 
v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 1994).  For an argument in support of the right of prison inmates 
to employ self-defense in general, see Anders Kaye, “Dangerous Places:  The Right to Self-Defense 
in Prison and Prison Conditions Jurisprudence,” University of Chicago Law Review 63, no. 2 (1996):  
693-726. 
26 State v. Schroeder, 199 Neb.  822 (1978). 
27 U.S. v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089 (7th Cir.  1998). 
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that Santana planned to assault him in the recreational yard later on.  Later, during 
the recreational period, Bello attacked Santana, who was playing dominoes, with 
a broom handle and gave him a serious concussion.28   
 
These cases have many similarities:  all involve verbal threats, all involve a fellow inmate 
with whom the potential victim had some prior contact, etc.  But significant differences 
exist as well.  Schroeder and Riggs were cellmates.  In Bello, the threat was reiterated 
through another individual, which was not the case in Schroeder or Haynes.  Schroeder 
and Haynes both faced repeated threats, whereas Bello’s situation seemed to be a one-time 
occurrence.  So, what should the criteria be for determining the relevant reference classes 
for these situations?   
 One approach might be to make the reference class as narrow and specific as 
possible, thereby restricting the question of what might happen in the ordinary course of 
things to cases with essentially all the same features.  This approach, however, seems to be 
unhelpful in that it simply does not give us enough comparative information, as the 
variation between cases will be great enough to restrict the reference class to an extent that 
will make it useless.  In fact, if the reference class were restricted far enough, the 
meaningfulness of the objective contemporaneous standard would dissipate.  Rather than 
focusing on the minute details of the case, I suggest that the appropriate way to establish 
the reference class is with broader criteria, using essential features as the means by which 
to include similar cases.  So, in the above three cases, it might be appropriate to separate 
Schroeder and Haynes from Bello, as in the former two cases, the defendant faced repeated 
threats that were backed by the reputation of the aggressor.  It is unrealistic to assume that 
we can establish indubitably clear lines for reference classes, but I believe that we are 
capable of distinguishing enough relevant similarities between cases to render the concept 
a useful tool. 
 
2.2 Types of Threat 
 
We have established that an objective contemporaneous standard for assessing risk 
is the best one we have at our disposal.  Next, we must determine what the appropriate 
inputs are for this method of assessment.  In other words, what sort of things should we 
consider when determining whether relevant risk exists in a self-defense situation?   
Some of the most important indicators of risk, at least for situations of self-defense, 
are threats.  A threat is something that indicates the possible existence of future harm.29  
                                                          
28 U.S. v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1999). 
29 Within the context of war and international self-defense, Dapo Akande and Thomas Lieflander 
define a threat in the following way: “A threat is a situation where a causal chain can lead from the 
status quo (no attack) to an undesired future (attack).”  See Akande and Lieflander, “Necessity, 
Imminence, and Proportionality in the Law of Self-Defense,” American Journal of International 
Law 107, no. 3 (2013): 564.  At least in the context of domestic self-defense, it might be more 
appropriate to think of a threat as an indication of a situation that could lead to the realization of 
harm.  Ferzan provides a definition to this effect:  “[T]hreats are actions that appear to present a risk 
of harm.”  Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” 736.  When an aggressor holds a gun to a victim’s 
head, that situation itself does not cause the future harm;  rather, the situation indicates that the future 
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Given this definition, threats are closely tied to risk assessments, as threats are the means 
by which a potential defender can evaluate the degree of risk he faces.  Generally, however, 
the only sorts of threat that have consistently been given weight in self-defense cases are 
ones that involve immediate physical violence.  Examples of such threats might be an 
aggressor putting a loaded gun to a victim’s head or an aggressor advancing upon a victim 
with an arm poised to strike.   
One type of threat (interestingly, the type of which we often think when using the 
word “threat” in everyday language) has been almost entirely excluded from self-defense:  
verbal threats.30  This restriction is understandable:  we do not want to broaden the type of 
threat considered legitimate to the extent that a joking or impulsive utterance of, “I’m going 
to kill you!” should justify someone in employing self-defense.  Mere utterances, most of 
the time, will not be enough to make a potential aggressor liable to defensive harm.31  In 
light of the discussion of risk in which we have been engaged, though, I suggest that it is 
appropriate to push back against this restriction as it stands.  In doing so, we need to 
distinguish between two different types of situations:  ones in which a verbal threat is the 
only indication of the existence of risk, and ones in which the risk evidenced by a verbal 
threat is confirmed by other information.  
 Consider the cases of Schroeder and Bello.  Recall that, in Bello, the facts of the 
case report that the reason Bello thought he was in danger was because Smith had verbally 
threatened him.  In Schroeder, the defendant also faced verbal threats from an aggressor, 
Riggs, but this threat was not the only reason Schroeder considered himself to be at 
significant risk.  Rather, Schroeder had both the evidence of the verbal threats and of the 
fact that Riggs had a reputation of abusing fellow inmates the way he was threatening to 
abuse Schroeder.  Thus, in Schroeder’s case, Riggs’s utterances were confirmed by 
excellent evidence that Riggs was not simply making idle verbal threats; in fact, even 
without the direct verbal threat, it does not seem completely unreasonable for Schroeder to 
have considered himself in danger.  So, for Schroeder, verbal threats confirmed what 
already would have been likely when evaluated under the contemporaneous objective 
standard:  similar situations involving the very same aggressor indicated that Schroeder 
truly was in danger.   
An objection to this approach is that it seems unfair to the aggressor: should a 
person really be liable to defensive harm even without engaging directly in physically 
                                                          
harm is likely by conveying the intentions of the aggressor and providing the means by which the 
aggressor can act on those intentions. 
30 For a court decision reflecting this view, see People v. Lucas: “[T]hreats alone, unaccompanied 
by some act which induces in defendant a reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted, 
do not justify a homicide.”  People v. Lucas, 160 Ca.  App.  2d 305, 310 (1958).  It is safe to assume 
that the wording of the opinion in this case meant “verbal threats” when referring to “threats.”   
31 Liability is a complicated topic that has attracted tremendous scholarly attention in recent years.  
Two primary accounts of liability frame the debate:  internalism, on which a person is liable to 
defensive harm only if such harm is necessary; and externalism, on which a person can be liable to 
defensive harm even if such harm is not necessary.  I believe that externalism is a better approach.  
For a defense of a version of externalism, see Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2014):  88-120.  Rather than focusing on the internalism/externalism debate, 
though, my question deals with what sorts of things can make someone liable to defensive harm.   
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abusive action?  I suggest that the right answer to this question is “yes.”  At least in the 
sorts of situations we are discussing, it seems undeniable that most aggressors are aware 
that their verbal threats will place their victims in a difficult situation; in fact, this is 
probably exactly why they choose to make the verbal threats.  So, liability is still being 
assigned based on the choice of the aggressor to initiate a game of risk.32  If anything, it 
seems unjust to the potential victim to force him to assume that the aggressor might not 
have meant what he said.  
This distinction between a threat that consists only of words and a verbal threat 
that is confirmed by other evidence gives us a tool with which to allow consideration of 
verbal threats while at the same time preserving reasonable restrictions on the type of threat 
that legitimizes self-defense.  The existence of verbal threats creates risk, and this risk is 
often not negligible.  Considering some verbal threats in addition to physical threats allows 
us to treat risk assessment with a greater level of seriousness and concern. 
 
2.3 Availability of Alternatives 
 
Another concern that often arises in self-defense situations is whether the defender 
had other alternatives to employ besides violent self-defense.  If a person can choose a 
course of action that can dispel the risk he faces and does not involve harming somebody 
else, that person should act in the non-harmful manner, even if the person against whom 
he is defending himself is fully culpable and liable to defensive harm.33  One of the ways 
this idea has been most clearly articulated is in the duty to retreat that is often demanded 
of potential self-defenders.34  I agree that, if safe retreat is an option, that option should be 
the most preferable one for the potential defender to use; however, in some situations 
retreat is not an option, and one of the reasons I have been considering prison violence 
cases is for that very reason.  So, the question becomes whether a person must seek 
alternative methods of averting the threat and dispelling the risk even when retreat is not 
an option. 
                                                          
32 Ferzan emphasizes the importance of the choice of the aggressor when defining what she thinks 
are appropriate “triggering conditions” for the use of self-defense:  “Now, it is true that we are 
allowing preemptive action based on prediction, but we are also allowing preemptive action based 
on the aggressor’s prior choice.  The aggressor controls whether she will decide to injure another 
person and she controls whether she will act on that intention.  At that point, the game is on.  It is a 
game of risk, and a game of prediction.  But the person who culpably initiates the situation can 
hardly be heard to complain that the other actor takes her at her word.”  Ferzan, “Justifying Self-
Defense,” 731.  
33 There are ways to affirm the wrongness of inflicting harm on an aggressor even if that aggressor 
is culpable and liable.  See Frowe, Defensive Killing, 89. 
34 The duty to retreat entails that if a person has a way to retreat from the violent situation in safety, 
he has an obligation to do so rather than use self-defense.  The Model Penal Code reflects this 
requirement, stating that an actor may not justifiably use deadly force if he “knows that he can avoid 
the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating.”  MPC § 3.04(2)(b)(ii).   
The duty to retreat has been questioned on several different levels:  exceptions include the so-called 
“castle doctrine” and “stand your ground” legislation.  For a recent argument in defense of the “stand 
your ground” approach, see Heidi Hurd, “Stand Your Ground,” in The Ethics of Self-Defense, ed. 
Christian Coons and Michael Weber (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2016):  254-273.   
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 In the prison violence cases under discussion, all three of the defendants were 
convicted.  Two of them were condemned on the grounds that they did not seek assistance 
in their respective situations.35  Theoretically, there was an alternative way for each of them 
to dispel the risk they faced rather than preemptively taking action and attacking their 
aggressors: each could have sought help, reported the abuse, or simply waited things out.36  
Theoretically, there was an alternative, but consideration of the reality brings risk into play 
again.  In many situations involving prison violence, inmates are reluctant to report abuse 
for several reasons, including fear of retaliation from the aggressor, being labeled a “snitch” 
by fellow inmates, which would very likely lead to a higher level of abuse, or the belief 
(and very likely a justified one) that no help would be given even if requested.37  Thus, 
even though these are alternatives to self-defense, they are not alternatives that 
unquestionably serve to avert the threat or dispel the risk—in fact, it is arguable that 
reporting abuse could actually increase the level of risk a person faces.  We do not demand 
fulfillment of the duty to retreat unless the person can do so in safety.  Why, then, do we 
always require the pursuit of alternatives to self-defense when doing so sometimes carries 
with it a risk of decreasing rather than increasing safety?   
 I suggest that requiring a person to take on additional risk as an alternative to 
employing self-defense is unjust.  The person who should bear additional risk in a violent 
situation is not the victim of the situation, but rather the person who culpably creates the 
situation.38  When possible, risk should be transferred to the person responsible for the 
creation of that risk.  If safe alternatives exist, the potential defender should pursue those 
alternatives, but if those alternatives themselves are risky, he should not be required to do 
so. 
 
 
                                                          
35 In Bello, the opinion stated, “Bello could have reported the incident to the guards and requested 
the protection they were required to provide.”  See U.S. v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 1999).  
This reasoning was based off of the court’s decision in U.S. v. Haynes, in which the opinion claimed 
that “absence of lawful alternatives is an element of all lesser-evil defenses, of which self-defense 
is one.”  See U.S. v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089, 1091 (7th Cir.  1998).  Interestingly, though, in the case 
of U.S. v. Biggs, the circuit court ruled as follows, in opposition to the decisions in Bello and Haynes: 
“Evidence that a defendant had no reasonable opportunity to avoid the use of force is relevant only 
to a defense of justification, whether labeled duress, coercion or necessity, and is not an element of 
a claim of self-defense.”  See U.S. v.  Biggs, 441 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir.  2006).  This opinion 
demonstrates that there is some hesitancy regarding the requirement that all available alternative 
must be exhausted before self-defense becomes a legitimate option. 
36 Some scholars suggest that the “wait and see” course of action is the appropriate one, because 
something might change that would render the use of self-defensive force superfluous.  See 
Bakircioglu, “The Contours of the Right to Self-Defense,” 161.  I think this approach places an 
unjust burden on the potential victim. 
37 For example, in Haynes, the aggressor had slammed the defendant down to the floor in front of a 
prison guard, and the guard had ignored the violence.  See U.S. v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089, 1090 (7th 
Cir.  1998).  In Schroeder, the defendant had requested that Riggs be moved to a different cell several 
days before, but no action was taken.  See State v. Schroeder, 199 Neb.  822, 824 (1978). 
38 Richard Rosen also argues for this claim in “On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill 
Their Batterers,” North Carolina Law Review 71, no. 2 (1993):  390-411. 
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3. Implications for Self-Defense Doctrine 
 
Throughout this paper, I have tried to avoid appealing to discussions about two of 
the central elements of the traditional (and still widely accepted) doctrine of self-defense:  
imminence and necessity.39  I deliberately avoided invoking these two features of the self-
defense doctrine, as doing so would have brought the argument to an abrupt halt.  Starting 
with imminence and necessity severely limits the range of discussion possible.  Yet, the 
latter two issues considered above—types of threats and availability of alternatives—are 
grounded in concerns about these two main features of most self-defense doctrines.40  Now 
that I have established methods for thinking about types of threats and availability of 
alternatives in light of risk assessments, we are in a position to confront the requirements 
of imminence and necessity, examining what the implications for these two features of self-
defense might be given the conclusions reached above.   
 First, consider imminence.  When we take risk assessments into account, it is clear 
that substantial risk can exist even when the danger to the potential victim is not imminent.  
Why, then, should we refuse to include these assessments of risk in our evaluation of the 
legitimacy of self-defense?  Defenders of imminence might answer that the imminence 
requirement serves two purposes with respect to risk:  to help provide a truly accurate 
assessment of risk, and to help ensure that the level of risk is high enough to merit self-
defensive action. 41  I will consider the former response first.  True, in most situations, it 
will be easier to assess risk with confidence that our assessment is accurate when 
imminence is present; after all, the shorter the time frame between the birth of the threat 
and the expected manifestation of that threat, the less we have to worry about factors that 
might intervene during that time frame.  I think this point would not be easy to dispute, and 
I will not attempt to do so; however, this, in itself, provides little reason to reject other 
valuable methods of risk assessment.  The contemporaneous objective standard explored 
above, in many situations, could yield an accurate assessment of risk even when the 
threatened harm is in the future. 
 Turn next to the latter objection on the part of the imminence defender:  imminence 
helps ensure that a very high level of risk is present.  The problem with this response is 
                                                          
39 As an example, here is Illinois’s statute: “A person is justified in the use of force against another 
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself 
or another against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force.”  720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/7-1 
(West 2014). 
40 The imminence requirement has been under fire in recent years.  For example, see Rosen, “On 
Self-Defense,” 371-411.  Reflecting these concerns, some jurisdictions have done away with the 
imminence requirement.  For example, see Texas’s self-defense statute: “[A] person is justified in 
using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is 
immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful 
force.”  Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31 (West 2007).  
41 Anthony Sebok suggests the belief that the level of risk cannot be high enough without physical 
confrontation is what motivated the decision in Schroeder: “[Judges] ultimately do not believe the 
probability of the infliction of a φ is ever as high in a nonconfrontational circumstance as it is in a 
confrontation.”  Anthony Sebok, “Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense Demand Too Much?”  
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 57 (1996):  741. 
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twofold.  First, given our discussion of risk, it seems we can reasonably claim that a very 
high level of risk is present in a situation even when imminence is absent.  Second, this 
objection seems to be assuming that only an extremely high level of risk—one approaching 
a certainty of harm—is sufficient to merit self-defensive action.  Imminence gives the 
benefit of the doubt to the aggressor rather than the defender, thereby shifting the burden 
of risk further into the defender’s court.42  But, given the above conclusion that the burden 
of risk should be shifted to the person responsible for the creation of the risk, this approach 
seems faulty.  As a result, imminence is a questionable requirement to put on the use of 
self-defense.   
Many scholars have suggested that the real reason imminence is generally 
considered to be important is because it shows us when self-defense is truly necessary.43  
This point brings us to another foundational element of self-defense doctrine.  The 
necessity prong of traditional self-defense doctrine says that a person may act in self-
defense only when defensive action is necessary to avert the harm in question.44  Now, as 
noted above, necessity is never absolute, because our limited epistemic position makes it 
impossible for us ever to be completely sure that defensive force is the only way a threat 
can be averted.  Nevertheless, we strive to as close an approximation of necessity as 
possible, and it continues to serve as the measuring stick by which we evaluate claims to 
self-defense. 45  Despite recognition of the fact that necessity cannot, practically, be 
absolute, I suggest self-defense doctrine has still failed to appreciate fully the difficulties 
posed by our limited epistemic status at the expense of many potential victims in 
threatening situations.   
 In most of the prison violence cases we have been considering, it would be a stretch 
to say that the use of self-defensive force was truly necessary.  The exception to this 
statement might be Schroeder:  since the defendant had already sought help, to no avail, 
                                                          
42 This reading is how Ferzan interprets the role of the imminence requirement: “Importantly, the 
imminence requirement, or absence thereof, shifts the risk of harm between the aggressor and the 
defender.”  Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” 719.  
43 This is a very common view of the role of imminence in the self-defense doctrine; scholars often 
refer to imminence as a “proxy” for necessity.  See Richard Rosen, “On Self-Defense,” 380.  Ferzan, 
however, defends the imminence requirement with different reasoning, claiming that getting rid of 
imminence leads to a failure to separate acts of self-defense from acts of mere self-preference and 
that imminence is not merely a proxy for necessity but serves an independent purpose—to determine 
when aggression is actually present.  See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Defending Imminence:  From 
Battered Women to Iraq.”  Arizona Law Review 46 (2004):  213-262.  Ferzan’s account of 
aggression seems to indicate that only physical attack can function as aggression, but I think verbal 
threats, at least when backed by known reputation, should count as aggressive action as well. 
44 Or when a person “reasonably believes” the action is necessary.  As we are trying to work within 
an objective framework, I will simply deal with an objective necessity requirement here.  
45 For example, Stephen Morse suggests using an extremely close approximation to necessity: “If 
death or serious bodily harm in the relatively near future is a virtual certainty and the future attack 
cannot be adequately defended against when it is imminent and if there really are no reasonable 
alternatives, traditional self-defense doctrine ought to justify the pre-emptive strike.”  See Stephen 
Morse, “‘New Syndrome Excuse’ Syndrome,” Criminal Justice Ethics 14 (1995):  12.  I believe, 
however, this level of “virtual certainty” is still unrealistic and is therefore unjust to the potential 
victim.  
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we might be comfortable with asserting that Schroeder had no other option open to him 
and that the risk was high enough (in that it was a close enough approximation to necessity) 
to legitimize self-defense when the necessity requirement is in place.  In the other cases, 
however, the defendants could have sought help, reported the threats, or simply waited 
things out to see what would happen.  But, as discussed above, requiring the defendants to 
follow any of these other paths arguably would have exposed them to an even higher level 
of risk than they already were facing.  If we want to maintain that it is unjust to force a 
person who is already a victim to take on additional risk in order to protect the person 
responsible for imposing risk, then we must say that such persons should not be forced to 
absorb any additional risk when doing so could be avoided.  And, if the only way to avoid 
absorbing additional risk is to transfer that risk to the aggressor, then we must say that the 
victim should transfer the risk to the aggressor.  And if the only way to transfer the risk to 
the aggressor is to act in preemptive self-defense, then the victim should be able to act in 
preemptive self-defense, even if such self-defense is not clearly necessary.    
This train of reasoning makes it clear that my analysis of risk assessment carries 
with it a major implication for self-defense doctrine:  it seems there are some situations in 
which a person should be able to act in self-defense even if we conclude self-defensive 
action did not really seem necessary.  In the prison violence cases described above, we 
cannot be sure that self-defensive action was necessary, but our level of confidence is even 
less when we consider whether the potential victim could have pursued an alternative 
course of action without thereby incurring a greater level of risk.  This undermining of 
necessity is a serious consequence, and it might be that it is a cost too great to justify using 
risk assessments in the way I have suggested.  Addressing this difficulty, however, is 
beyond the scope of this project, so I will consider it sufficient to point out the problem 
and leave the weighing of the costs and benefits for another time.  From this discussion, 
however, it is clear that taking risk seriously in self-defensive situations has deep 
consequences for self-defense doctrine as it is currently written and generally accepted. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Let us return to the pair of cases that motivated this exploration of the concept of 
risk.  Recall that in Case 1, Dr. Maleficus was playing Russian roulette with Bill, holding 
a gun with one thousand chambers to Bill’s head.  In Case 2, the Dread Pirate Roberts had 
threatened to kill Westley in the morning, but during the night Westley had a chance to kill 
the Dread Pirate Roberts first.  Current self-defense doctrine would be able to absolve Bill 
but not Westley, and I suggested this outcome seems wrong.   
 Given my argument regarding the proper application of risk analysis to cases of 
self-defense, we now have the tools to make a case for the claim that Westley should also 
be able to act in self-defense.  Westley faces risk of death, and as judged by a 
contemporaneous objective standard, that risk is significant.  The threats of the Dread Pirate 
Roberts have been given in verbal form, and as of yet, he has not physically threatened 
Westley; however, those verbal threats contain a high level of credibility given the other 
evidence Westley has about the merciless history of the pirate.  Westley, arguably, has 
some alternatives he could pursue rather than acting in self-defense:  he could simply wait 
things out, he could try to escape on a lifeboat, or he could hide someplace on the ship and 
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hope he is not discovered before the ship reaches the next port.  But, even if any of these 
alternatives have a chance of success, they all require Westley to absorb additional risk.  
Given these considerations, it seems that the level of risk Westley faces is sufficient to 
merit him acting in self-defense, despite the facts that the threat he faces is not imminent 
and that it is not clear that acting in self-defense is truly necessary.  Thus, if Bill is justified 
in killing Dr. Maleficus, despite the low level of risk Bill faces, Westley should be able to 
kill the Dread Pirate Roberts in self-defense. 
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The Christianization of Judith: 
Considering the Hieronymian 
Translation of Liber Iudith and 
Jerome’s Christianizing Agenda 
 
Brody Van Roekel 
 
Abstract 
 
I will consider Jerome’s translation using gendered analysis while considering 
carefully how hints of his own preoccupations and Christianizing agendas can be 
found within. In Liber Iudith, Jerome gives a night’s work to a text illustrating the 
story of the Hebrew widow Judith single-handedly overcoming the seemingly 
unassailable Assyrians. By comparing Jerome’s translation to the earlier Septuagint 
text, a number of significant departures can be located. These departures 
demonstrate Jerome’s conception of proper Christian widowhood, related too to his 
qualms with femininity. The Hieronymian changes then appear to be both 
culturally-motivated and implemented in response to the demands of an 
increasingly Christian world. 
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Notes on Methodology and Thesis 
 
 This project seeks to examine the Christianizing undertones of patristic 
writers related to translations of the Vulgate Bible and the role of widows in the 
Christian schema. Specifically, I will consider Jerome’s translation of the Book of 
Judith using gendered analysis while considering carefully how hints of his own 
preoccupations and Christianizing agendas can be found within. In Liber Iudith, 
Jerome, working in the fourth- and fifth-centuries, illustrates the story of the 
Hebrew widow Judith single-handedly overcoming the seemingly unassailable 
Assyrians. The Septuagint, written in Greek and not Hebrew, may be the original 
text for the Book of Judith. Alternatively, it may be a translation of a now-lost 
Hebrew text. By comparing Jerome’s Latin translation to the earlier Septuagint 
Greek text, a number of significant departures can be located. These departures 
demonstrate Jerome’s conception of proper Christian widowhood, related too to his 
qualms with femininity. The Hieronymian changes related to Jerome then appear 
to be both culturally motivated and implemented in response to the demands of an 
increasingly Christian world.1 The Hieronymian translation of Liber Iudith 
demonstrates Jerome’s commitment to translating the Biblical text sensus e sensu. 
While much of the “sense” of earlier texts is essentially present, the Christianization 
of the Hebrew woman, Judith, is apparent in Jerome’s noticeable alterations. 
 
Introduction: Hebraea illa 
 
 As the nearly ubiquitous Christianization of the Mediterranean world 
proceeded between 100 CE and 500 CE, the early architects of the burgeoning 
religion sought paradigmatic and often pre-existing figures to tie to their novel 
worldviews. Renegotiated mores necessitated that the Church Fathers refashion 
some of those figures in order that they be better suited to their values. Many of the 
patristic writers, educated in pagan schools, had a fondness for classical literature, 
as many were trained in classical works. Among other patristic authors, Augustine 
spoke in his Confessions of the lasting impact classical literature had upon him.2 
The appreciation led some of them to consider many classical authors as 
progenitors to Christianity and to depict them as such. Moreover, patristic authors 
needed to reconsider the Jewish texts with which Jesus was so familiar. The Church 
                                                          
1 K. F. B. Fletcher, “Hyginus’ Fabulae: Toward a Roman Mytholography,” in Writing Myth: 
Mythography in the Ancient World, ed. S. Trzaskoma and R. Scott Smith (Leuven: Peeters, 2013), 
135; although Fletcher applies this theoretical approach to the first-century BCE author Hyginus, 
the framework can also be applied to Jerome’s translation of the Latin Vulgate. 
2 Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, trans. J.G. Pilkington, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 
1, ed. Philip Schaff (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing, 1887), IV.7. 
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Fathers’ religion was something novel, neither Greco-Roman nor Judaic, but a 
combination of various extant frameworks from around the Mediterranean.  
 The legalization of Christianity by Constantine in the fourth century 
precipitated an even greater push to formalize the institutions and orthodoxy of 
Christianity, as the faith provided another opportunity to consolidate political 
power. With that formalization, notions of gender hierarchy also crystalized. 
Church Fathers generally co-opted classical structures of feminine submission. 
However, certain aspects of Christianized conceptions of gender allowed for 
possible expansions of female agency. Women could give up sexuality altogether, 
entering a life of voluntary celibacy. The roles of women in specific situations were 
also reconsidered. Widows, a commonplace reality given the youth of most wives 
in the ancient world, constituted a unique position. Likely older upon their 
husbands’ death, widows were left in a precarious position for a variety of reasons. 
Already second-class citizens, widows had left their father’s protection. Widows 
who did not have children were in an even more problematic situation. Without a 
daughter to marry into the expanded protection of another man or a son to command 
the household, widows were essentially alone in the world.  
 One such widow, the Jewess Judith, was alone except for her servants.3 
Following her husband’s death, she remained single, but not for lack of suitors. Her 
pious disposition earned her great respect from her community.4 The author of 
Judith’s account also made her beauty exceedingly evident. The wealth left to her 
by her husband allowed her to maintain a home filled with servants.5 All of these 
factors combine to both legitimize and make possible Judith’s salvation of her 
homeland. Additionally, the original character of Judith appears to be soundly a 
product of Jewish and Hellenistic perspectives.6 In his translation of Liber Iudith, 
Jerome uses the virtuous qualities of the Jewish woman Judith, such as chastity, 
elegance, and status, to his advantage.  
In order to better depict her as an example of widowhood to Christian 
women, Jerome departs in various instances from the earlier Septuagint text. He 
insists that Judith’s chaste living is an important factor in her success, tying it 
                                                          
3 When referring to Latin phrases or sentences, I have employed the Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam 
Versionem, edited by Robert Weber et. al. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2007). English 
translations from the Vulgate have been rendered by myself, along with the MDVL 6000 class. 
English translations from the Septuagint come from Septuaginta: Vetus Testamentum Graecum 
Auctoritate Academiae Scientiarum Gottingensis editum VIII.4: Iudith (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1979). In order to easily differentiate between the Jerome’s Vulgate translation and 
the Septuagint version of the same text, I will henceforth refer to both Jerome’s text and its 
respective translations with “Iudith” and English translations from the Septuagint with “Ioudith.” 
4 Iudith 8:8. 
5 Iudith 8:7. 
6 Judith, Deborah Levine Gera, Loren T. Stuckenbruk, and Hermann Lictenberger, ed. (Berlin: 
DeGruyter, 2014). 
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intimately with her piety. While Judith’s beauty remained an explicit detail, the 
Hieronymian translation also asserted that her beauty was blessed by the Lord and 
not intended for the pollution of seduction. Finally, Jerome portrays the memory of 
Judith almost as if she were a canonized Christian sancta. The changes adopted by 
Jerome demonstrate the conscious and subconscious, culturally motivated 
reflections underlying his translations. New Christians of all contexts and situations 
were looking for examples upon which to base their lives. For widows, then, the 
Hieronymian Christianized Judith provided the perfect model. 
 
Judith’s Chaste Widowhood and the Masculine Overpowering of 
Womanhood 
  
An especial focus on chastity constitutes the most significant addition in 
Jerome’s rendering of Liber Iudith. Examining the growing prevalence of chastity 
in the increasingly Christian world, it is unsurprising that Jerome puts such 
significant effort into depicting Judith as such. While chastity was largely expected 
for women in the ancient world, at least until marriage, social regulations on men’s 
sex lives generally were more loosely guarded. Christianized late antique 
perspectives slightly altered this reality. Sexual purity began to govern proper 
masculine behavior along with proper feminine behavior. The imperative to 
subjugate the body to the mind had roots in the classical school of thought, 
Stoicism.7 Adapted by early Christians, chaste living mutated from an essentially 
feminine virtue in the ancient world into one that was increasingly masculine.8 This 
mutation is best shown in tying Christ, the perfect man, closely to chastity. 
Ambrose, the fourth-century bishop of Milan, explains in De virginibus how 
virginal chastity is both essentially freedom from sin and an imitation of the 
immaculate Son of God.9  
Both the command to live continently and the connection between 
masculinity and chastity are found in Liber Iudith as Hieronymian additions. 
Jerome’s Prologus offers a useful and unadulterated view into the translator’s 
apparent agenda. As words penned by Jerome himself without the obligation of 
                                                          
7 Mathew Kuefler, “Desire and the Body in the Patristic Period,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Theology, Sexuality, and Gender, ed. Adrian Thatcher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
243. 
8 Julia M. H. Smith, “The Problem of Female Sanctity in Carolingian Europe c. 780-920,” Past & 
Present, no. 146 (1995): 18. Though this article considers a later context, looking to solidified 
examples of femininity in Carolingian Europe can supplement our understanding of earlier 
contexts. 
9 Ambrosius Mediolanensis - De uirginibus (CPL 0145) - LLT-A, lib. : 1, cap. : 5, par. : 21, linea : 
1: “Quid autem est castitas uirginalis nisi expers contagionis integritas? Atque eius auctorem quem 
possumus aestimare nisi immaculatum dei filium, cuius caro non uidit corruptionem, diuinitas non 
est experta contagionem? Videte igitur quanta uirginitatis merita sint.” 
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translation, they provide essentially a single-remove from the patristic author. 
Moreover, the Prologus contains two of the four instances of castitas, “chastity,” 
in the Book of Judith. After expressing the initial disinterest he held towards the 
account of Judith, Jerome implores readers to receive the story of the widow 
Judith.10 He also commands readers to make the Hebrew widow known through 
everlasting praise.11 For most readers, such praise may certainly be warranted. The 
enthralling tale of a single woman overcoming insurmountable odds in order to save 
her city grabs readers’ attention. Yet, Jerome interestingly does not explicitly 
mention this main theme from Liber Iudith in his prologue.  
Rather than depict her as a victorious hero of her people, Jerome opts to dub 
Judith an exemplum castitatis or an example of chastity. Here, the translator alludes 
to his inherent cultural motivation. Judith must be a paragon for the new chaste 
ideal so integral to Jerome’s work. Indeed, Jerome himself also notes that she 
provides an archetype to which both women and men need to aspire.12 The 
translator also suggests that her castitas should be ascribed exceedingly great 
“virtue.”13 These examples demonstrate the importance of continence to Jerome 
and chastity’s new masculinization. Judith is an obvious paradigm for women, but 
the suggestion that she may also be imitated by men is striking. This fact is 
especially prescient with Jerome’s inclusion of virtus, or “virtue,” and its use to 
describe the Hebrew woman. Jerome and other architects of the early church utilize 
the theme of femina virilis or virago for women whose ascetic prowess transcends 
their gender.14 Patristic terminology tied masculinity to virtue. For women to be 
virtuous, they needed to become masculine.15 
While cenobitic monasticism was only beginning to crystalize in the fourth 
century, Jerome had a ready example of female monasticism in Judith. Women 
ascetics were often represented as adopting forms of domestic asceticism in which 
they conducted their renunciations in their familial household.16 Judith’s ascetic 
home life provides a good foundation upon which Jerome can expand her general 
piety into specific sexual purity, a relatively short jump considering Jerome’s 
cultural milieu. In addition to the instances of castitas in Jerome’s prologue, the 
translator introduces the same phrase into his Latin rendering, while also tying the 
virtue of chastity to masculinity outright. In the final chapter of Liber Iudith, the 
                                                          
10 Jerome, “Prologus” for Liber Iudith, in Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem, ed. Robert 
Weber et. al. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2007), 691: “Accipite Iudith viduam.”  
11 Jerome, “Prologus,” 691: “triumphali laude perpetuis eam praeconiis declarate.” 
12 Jerome, “Prologus,” 691: “Hanc enim non solum feminis, sed et viris imitabilem dedit.” 
13 Jerome, “Prologus,” 691: “castitatis eius rumunerator, virtutem talem tribuit.” 
14 Smith, “Problem of Female Sanctity,” 18. 
15 Gillian Cloke, The Female Man of God: Women and Spiritual Power in the Patristic Age, AD 
350-450 (London: Routledge, 2995), 218. 
16 Elizabeth A. Clark, “Holy Women, Holy Words: Early Christian Women, Social History, and 
the 'Linguistic Turn’” Journal of Early Christian Studies 6, no. 3 (1998): 416. 
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author describes how the hero Judith spends the remainder of her days in Bethulia. 
Following the downfall of Holofernes and Israel’s salvation, the protagonist returns 
to her home to renew her cloister-esque domesticity.  
Yet, a few important differences can be seen between the texts. Though it 
is implicit, Jerome introduces a subtle voice change in his translation. The 
Septuagint text relates that “no man knew her in all the days of her life since the 
day Manasses her husband had died.”17 This example assigns agency to the men 
who wanted to know Judith. Jerome, however, reverses this agency and depicts 
Judith as the active subject. He writes, “she was knowing no man for all days of her 
life, from the day when Manasses died, her husband.”18 It is also important to note 
that, had Jerome made cognosceret passive in voice, there would be no essential 
difference. However, Judith is the subject of the active verb, and thus, the actor 
herself.  
Moreover, Jerome replaces entirely the sentiment preceding the line 
examined above. The Septuagint notes that “many [men] desired” Judith.19 
Jerome’s understanding of the sexual nature of this desire necessitated his need to 
add to his translation. In lieu of men lusting after the Hebrew widow, Jerome adds 
that Judith was included in the “virtue of chastity.”20 The Church Father connects 
closely castitas with virtus. With the etymological connection between the Latin 
word for “man,” vir, and virtus or “virtue,” one can then see the logical association 
between manliness and chastity. Purity was now a moral imperative, and this 
absolute divide between male and female likewise divided virtue and vice.21 The 
divide and Judith’s uniqueness can be best seen in Jerome’s final inclusion of 
castitas.  
Immediately following the Bethulian victory over the Assyrians, the head 
priest Joachim and all of his elders travel from Jerusalem in order to meet 
Holofernes’ bane. The following quotations from the elders require special 
attention. Instances of direct speech are useful as they are obviously chosen by the 
author, putting words in the subject’s mouth. Upon meeting Judith, Joachim and 
the elders extol Judith as the glory of Jerusalem, the joy of Israel, and honored by 
her people.22 After these praises, the elders speak a number of conditional 
statements. They commend Judith for acting in a manly way.23 They note how she 
                                                          
17 Ioudith 16:22. 
18 Iudith 16:26: “[Iudith] non cognosceret virum omnibus diebus vitae suae.” 
19 Ioudith 16:22. 
20 Iudith 16:26: “Erat enim virtuti castitatis adjuncta.”  
21 Mathew Kuefler, The Manly Eunuch: Masculinity, Gender Ambiguity, and Christian Ideology in 
Late Antiquity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 19. 
22 Iudith 15:9-10: “Joachim autem summus pontifex de Jerusalem venit in Bethuliam cum 
universis presbyteris suis ut videret Judith. Quae cum exisset ad illum, benedixerunt illam omnes 
una voce, dicentes : Tu gloria Hierusalem; tu laetitia Israhel; tu honorificentia populi nostri.” 
23 Iudith 15:11: “fecisti viriliter.” 
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loved castitas in her heart.24 They recognize that Judith has known no other man 
after Manasses died.25 Each of these factors were prerequisites for their final 
statements. Because Judith had acted viriliter, had maintained her chaste heart, and 
had remained a widow, the Lord strengthened her. Moreover, from these virtues 
and the Lord’s strength, she would receive eternal blessing.26 The Septuagint text 
details a similar blessing by the Lord, but beyond this similarity, the other aspects 
of v. 11 are wholly introduced by Jerome.27 The alterations in this verse constitute 
perhaps the most explicit revelation of Jerome’s agenda. Only by acting in a manly 
fashion, demonstrated in masculine chastity, could Judith overcome Holofernes, 
receive the Lord’s comfort, and gain eternity.  
Although Jerome’s translation of Liber Iudith provides a plethora of 
evidence for his culturally motivated rendering, a few other texts solidify the 
arguments. In a letter from Jerome and a work from Ambrose, the prominent 
Church Fathers further disclose their conception of chaste Christian widowhood. 
These works mention Judith specifically. In an epistle, Jerome relates the account 
of Judith as an example to the newly widowed Furia. The encouraging account of 
“woman vanquishing men” and “chastity beheading lust” represents Jerome’s 
dichotomized views.28 By juxtaposing these two sentiments, Jerome suggests that 
Judith, only through her chastity, is able to overcome the lust of Holofernes. 
Additionally, in the opinion of Ambrose, it is only through her chastity that Judith 
                                                          
24 Iudith 15:11: “et confortatum est cor tuum, eo quod castitatem amaveris.” 
25 Iudith 15:11: “post virum tuum, alterum non scieris.” 
26 Iudith 15:11: “ideo et manus Domini confortavit te, et ideo eris benedicta in aeternum.” 
27 See the full passages for both the Vulgate and the Septuagint: Iudith 15:9-12: “(9) Moreover, 
Joachim, highest priest from Jerusalem, came into Bethulia, with all his elders, in order to see 
Judith. (10) Who, when she had gone out to him, all blessed her in one voice, saying: you are 
glory of Jerusalem; you are joy of Israel, you are honored of our people. (11) Because you have 
done with manly virtue, and your heart was strengthened, in it because you love chastity and 
after your man, you knew no other: therefore, the hand of the Lord also strengthened you, 
and therefore you shall be blessed in eternity. (12) And all people said: Let it be, let it be.” 
Compare these verses to Ioudith 15:8-10: “(8) And Ioakeim the great priest and the senate of the 
sons of Israel, those residing in Ierousalem, came in order to view the good things which the Lord 
had accomplished for Israel and to see Ioudith and to speak peace with her. (9) Now when they 
came to her, they all blessed her with one accord, and they said to her: “You are the exaltation of 
Ierousalem; you are the great pride of Israel; you are the great boast of our race. (10) You 
accomplished all these things by your hand; you accomplished good things with Israel, and 
God was pleased on account of them. Be blessed before the omnipotent Lord for all time.” 
And all the people said: ‘So be it.’” 
28 Hieronymus - Epistulae (CPL 0620) - LLT-A epist. : 54, vol. : 54, par. : 16, pag.: 484, linea : 3: 
“uincit uiros femina et castitas truncat libidinem.” 
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overcomes the Assyrians. 29 The triumph of Judith’s preserved chastity equals the 
achievement of delivering her country.  
For Ambrose and Jerome, the quality of Judith lies in her chastity. Their 
sentiments are explicit in their own works, which readily reflect their opinions. 
Moreover, the prologue to Liber Iudith allows Jerome to disclose some of his 
preoccupations. Jerome’s opinions, however, become more problematic when 
rendered in translation. In translation, the prescription of chastity for the Hebrew 
widow Judith appears in various facets of the text. These occurrences represent 
marked departures from the earlier Septuagint text. Even in translating, then, 
Jerome’s agenda shines through. Whether made consciously or not, the translator 
chooses specific instances to paint the text with his own hue. For the solidifying 
Christian religion, chastity was paramount, and for Jerome, Judith’s story was 
useful in depicting that virtue. 
 
Elegance and Not Seduction: Depicting Judith as an Unadulterated Beauty 
 
 The account of Judith absorbs readers with compelling characters and a 
relatable story. It is understandable why Jerome rendered it in Latin, even 
considering his apparent reluctance evidenced by his prologue to Liber Iudith. The 
most substantial translation variance used to Christianize Judith stems from 
Jerome’s castitas additions. Given the importance of sexual continence to early and 
later Christians, these additions should be largely unsurprising. Other slight 
changes are also discernable in the texts. In both the Vulgate and Septuagint the 
beauty of Judith is well-attested. However, the Septuagint characterizes Judith’s 
beauty almost as a tool for sexual temptation. Jerome’s bowdlerizing sensibilities 
compel the translator to curtail the alluring nature of the Hebrew woman, depicting 
her elegance instead of her seductive nature.  
 Jerome’s translation demonstrates instances of the translator smoothing 
over Judith’s beauty. The Vulgate entails a widow, just as stunning as her 
Septuagint counterpart. Yet, there is a careful delineation of Judith’s beauty and her 
use of it. An aesthetically pleasing appearance represents a central trait for good 
women and men in the ancient world. This centrality was adopted by Christianity’s 
architects and remained a defining feature of virtuous people in the Middle Ages. 
However, beauty was not simply skin deep. Indeed, a beautiful body denoted a 
beautiful soul.30 The most important difference stemmed from the employment of 
attractiveness. As seen in the previous section, many of the Church Fathers 
                                                          
29 Ambrosius Mediolanensis, De uiduis, (CPL 0146) - LLT-A cap. : 7, par. : 39, linea : 2-5: 
“abstinentiae meritum, pudicitiae gratiam reseruaret. Nec cibo enim, ut legimus, maculata, nec 
adultero, non minorem seruatae castitatis ex hostibus reuexit triumphum quam patriae liberatae.” 
30 Dick Harrison, The Age of Abbesses and Queens: Gender and Political Culture in Early 
Medieval Europe (Sweden: Nordic Academic Press, 1998), 345. 
 
 
 
39 
 
regarded purity of the body as an imperative for all adherents. Jerome’s inclusion 
of castitas throughout shows this preoccupation.   
 Thus, Jerome is faced with the prospect of keeping Judith’s beauty intact, 
while also depicting her as unquestionably pure. The tying of Judith’s beauty and 
piety is largely accomplished through castitas. Yet, other instances stand out in 
Jerome’s translation upon its comparison to the Greek text. Following her 
admonishment of Bethulia’s elders, Judith returns to her home in order to prepare 
for her mission. In a montage akin to arming oneself for battle, Judith strips off the 
garments of widowhood and washes herself in preparation. The widow dons 
charming clothes and striking ornamentations. She, along with her servant girl, also 
packs supplies which were in keeping with Hebrew food guidelines. The two set 
out and find Ozias, the high priest of Bethulia, at the city gates. 
 In the midst of Judith’s preparations, Jerome deems the situation a fitting 
location for a slight but noticeable departure from the original text. The Septuagint 
summarizes her aesthetic preparations succinctly and sharply. “She made herself 
up provocatively for the charming of the eyes of men,” reads the text, “all who 
would cast eyes upon her.”31 This verse shows how the main purpose of Judith’s 
beauty was for the provocation of men. Jerome, at least, appears to have read the 
verse in this manner. He surely rails against this sentiment in his translation. Going 
beyond simply truncating the problematic text, Jerome instead decides to inject his 
own preoccupations.  
After ornamenting herself, Jerome writes, “To [Judith], truly, truly, the Lord 
bestowed brilliance: since all that arrangement was depending not from lust, but 
from virtue: and therefore the Lord augmented this woman in that beauty, in order 
that she was appearing in unique elegance in the eyes of all men.”32 A number of 
aspects of this translational addition require examination. The first, and most 
important, lies in the genesis of Judith’s beauty. The Septuagint text relates that 
Judith made herself more beautiful, implicitly through her dress and jewelry in 
addition to her already lovely appearance. Jerome describes her splendor as having 
come from the Lord, instead of Judith herself. Moreover, the “arrangement” 
depended not upon libido or provocation from Judith’s appearance as related in the 
Septuagint. Rather, virtus is the basis of her plans. Because the plot rested upon 
virtus and not libido, then, the Lord provides for the augmentation of Judith’s 
beauty.  
Finally, Jerome appears to smooth out the description of Judith’s 
appearance in the eyes of men. She looks “uniquely elegant” in the eyes of all men. 
The sharpness of the manly lustful gaze is dampened, and Judith emerges as an 
                                                          
31 Ioudith 10:4. 
32 Iudith 10: 4: “Cui etiam Dominus contulit splendorem : quoniam omnis ista compositio non ex 
libidine, sed ex virtute pendebat : et ideo Dominus hanc in illam pulchritudinem ampliavit, ut 
incomparabili decore omnium oculis appareret.” 
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elegant beauty instead of a provocative seductress. The Septuagint translator writes 
that as Judith dresses, she puts on clothes “with which she was accustomed to dress 
in the days of the life of her husband Manasses.”33 While there is nothing explicitly 
related to seduction in this remark, the mentioning of Judith’s deceased husband 
apparently disturbs the Latin translator. This sentiment is entirely missing from 
Jerome’s translation.  
The purpose for this omission is twofold. On the one hand, Jerome’s 
subordination of marriage to virginity is well-known.34 Additionally, Jerome 
considers marriage as a lesser good than chaste widowhood. Judith’s purity bound 
with her widowhood yields a good far beyond marriage. On the other hand, many 
patristic writers considered marriage to be the only legitimate outlet for sexual 
activity. By reminding readers of Judith’s marriage to Manasses, the Septuagint 
writer also prompts readers of Judith’s story to remember aspects of her sexuality. 
Jerome must do away with Judith’s sexuality while also elevating her as an 
archetypical chaste widow, the second highest spiritual yield behind virginity. 
The translator carefully delineates between Judith’s beauty and her usage of 
it. The Hebrew widow’s beauty must remain intact, as a physically pleasing 
appearance was a prerequisite for her virtue. Jerome has, however, pared away any 
notion of a connection between beauty and lust. The Lord imparted beauty unto 
Judith and ultimately blessed her mission due to her virtus. A good Christian widow 
engaging in seduction would have been unthinkable. The extraction of beauty from 
seduction essentially connects back to Jerome’s attempts to depict Judith’s 
continence. She was elegant, not sultry. Furthermore, in Jerome’s mind, marriage 
was largely without benefit. It seems that the only benefit of Judith’s marriage for 
Jerome is the status it imparts unto the Hebrew widow, an aspect of Judith’s account 
which is considered in the final section. 
 
Memory of the Hebrew Woman: Status, Confrontation, and Holy Days 
 
 Jerome elucidates most explicitly the important facets of Christian 
widowhood, continence and untainted beauty. He finally moves to illustrate other 
aspects of Judith’s Christian-widow exemplarity. The translator maintains certain 
criteria of Christian widows, including social status and confrontation with the 
elders, and also adds the ascription of holy days to paradigmatic Christian figures 
to Judith’s narrative. Admittedly, the addition of feast days in Jerome’s translation 
is an argument from silence regarding the Septuagint text. Yet, there does not seem 
to be an analogous piece in the Septuagint text that is comparable to the inclusion 
                                                          
33 Ioudith 10:3. 
34 Hiero, Epist. 48, “ad pammachium.” In this letter, Jerome defends his exaltation of virginity 
against opinions that his reverence had come at the cost of marriage. See also Ruth Mazo Karras, 
Sexuality in Medieval Europe: Doing unto Others. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2012), 42. 
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of Christian holy days. Moreover, social status and confrontation simply appear in 
both the Vulgate and Septuagint, and thus these considerations diverge slightly 
from the main thrust of the paper.  
These aspects of the Hieronymian rendering of Liber Iudith are nonetheless 
important. The growing need for institutionalized orthodoxy and orthopraxy 
necessitated a full examination of widowhood in the case of Jerome’s translation. 
The Jewess Judith needed to look as Christian as possible, while also providing an 
idealized vision to Christian widows. The consistency of certain characteristics 
facilitates this appearance. References to Judith’s extravagant wealth and status 
occur unambiguously in both the Septuagint and Vulgate.35 Indeed, part of her plot 
against Holofernes requires her to be sumptuously dressed.36 In addition to her 
wealth, Judith’s social positionality rings through the Septuagint text as well as 
Jerome’s translation.37 Her lineage and previous marriage also precedes her 
account, only adding to her understood status. 
Only after sketching her as the epitome of wealth and status in the Bethulian 
community does the author feel confident enough to describe her encounter with 
the town’s authorities. Jerome consciously follows this pattern as it coincides well 
with his agenda for Judith. Status for women derived from their vast inherited 
wealth and social position.38 A danger of that status, however, was expanded 
agency on the part of widows. Increased agency could lead to attention and 
resulting consequences, which was especially a problem in a society that did not 
value women as full members. Such clout led to guards on their actions.39 Judith 
needed her status accorded to her by wealth and position in order to confront the 
doubting Ozias. Yet, after the Assyrians are dealt with, she resumes her life of 
domestic asceticism.  
Judith’s return to her previous life connects well with what seems to be 
Jerome and others’ ideal for female ascetic practice. Women ascetics were often 
represented conducting their renunciations in their familial household.40 The 
earliest stages of Christianity could provide women with an opportunity for 
rebellion as the burgeoning religion was at first at the margins of society like 
women. Jerome, though, carefully avoids support for women in leadership or 
clerical privilege.41 Yet, a subtle message remained: generally excessive female 
                                                          
35 Iudith 8:7, 15:14; Ioudith 8:7, 15:11. 
36 Iudith 10:3; Ioudith 10:4. 
37 Iudith 8:8; Ioudith 8:8.  
38 Clark, “Holy Women, Holy Words,” 414. 
39 Margaret Y. MacDonald, Early Christian Women and Pagan Opinion: The Power of the 
Hysterical Woman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 181. 
40 Clark, “Holy Women, Holy Words,” 416. 
41 Gail Streete, “Women as Sources of Redemption and Knowledge in Early Christian Traditions,”
 in Women & Christian Origins, ed. Ross Shepard Kraemer and Mary Rose D’Angelo 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 342. 
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agency contravened the boundaries of tolerable diversity. It was one thing to admire 
women such as Judith, but another thing entirely to imitate her.42 The good 
Christian widow could not assume a public role that would overstep “certain clearly 
felt limits and thereby contradict that within her which remains female.”43 
Admiration for holy persons could take a variety of forms, one of which 
entailed feast days in remembrance of especially holy individuals. The Catholic 
holy calendar is ripe with paragons and sainted men and women. A prominent 
Hieronymian addition in the final verse of Judith’s account requires a final note. 
Judith had done the impossible against Holofernes and the Assyrian hordes. The 
widow challenged the men of her city who questioned God’s protection. She had 
remained a prominent figure in Bethulia after her success. Even the high priest of 
Jerusalem had commended her on her virtus and accomplishment. She returned to 
a life of domestic asceticism and lived out the remnant of her life in continence and 
sanctity.  
Were Judith a Christian, her name may have been included in the list of 
Catholic saints. But Judith was obviously Jewish. However, Jerome could not 
forego the opportunity to give her a Christian hue one last time. The Septuagint text 
closes with Judith’s burial and the assurance that none accosted Israel during 
Judith’s life and “for many days after she had died.”44 The Vulgate follows this 
reading, declaring to readers that none disturbed Israel. This verse does not close 
the Latin translation though. In his prologue to Liber Iudith, Jerome appended to 
his rendering, “Moreover, the day of this victory obtained a holiday by the Hebrews 
in the number of holy days, and it was maintained by the Jews from that time, up 
into the present day.”45  
Hebrews celebrated various holy days. One for Judith probably would have 
been out of the ordinary, at least for someone with a cursory understanding of 
Jewish practice. The addition would not be unusual at all except for its glaring 
absence in the Septuagint. One can only guess at Jerome’s specific motivations 
here. The notion of a holy day tangentially dedicated to Judith might have been 
reminiscent of the litany of Christian sancta and their feast days. Jerome might have 
been giving encouragement to Christian widows, showing the possibilities of 
dedicating their lives to piety and chastity using the widow Judith. Regardless of 
specific motivations, Jerome’s general agenda remains the same in this final 
alteration as it has been throughout the translation.  
                                                          
42 Jane Tibbetts Schulenburg, Forgetful of Their Sex: Female Sanctity and Society, ca. 500-1100 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 407-408. 
43 Susanna Elm, Virgins of God: The Making of Asceticism in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 166. 
44 Ioudith 16:25. 
45 Iudith 15:31: “Dies autem victoriae hujus festivitatem ab Hebraeis in numero dierum sanctorum 
accepit, et colitur a Judaeis ex illo tempore usque in praesentem diem.” 
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Conclusion: Christiana illa 
 
Throughout Jerome’s translation of Liber Iudith, the patristic writer works 
to sketch Judith in the manner of an idealized Christian widow. This agenda, as has 
been shown, appears explicitly when comparing Jerome’s translation to the earlier 
Septuagint text. In his additions, glosses, and occasional textual removals, Jerome 
fully demonstrates his intentions for the Hebrew widow. Even certain continuities 
between the Septuagint and Vulgate texts show a consciousness in attempting to 
sketch Judith as a character upon which Christian women, especially widows, could 
draw.  
The character trait for Jerome’s Judith was castitas. The term only appears 
four times in Jerome’s translation, two of which occur in the Prologus. The 
prologue gives readers an idea of Jerome’s main intent for the text. Judith ought to 
be viewed as an example in many ways, but most importantly as an exemplum 
castitatis. The additions in his translation are stark and their placement significant. 
The first use comes in the form of a direct quote from the high priest of Jerusalem, 
Joachim. Direct speech is especially useful as the author can impart vital ideas from 
the mouths of important characters. The character being quoted also requires 
thought. One of the highest-ranking authorities in all of Israel commends Judith for 
her castitas.  
The second usage of the term ties to virtus and the masculinization of Judith. 
Continence increasingly was viewed as a masculine value. Moreover, for Christian 
women to become virtuous, they needed to shed their femininity. Both of these 
notions are demonstrated in Jerome’s Judith. Her abstinence is on display due to 
Jerome’s work. She is also connected to virtus throughout. Additionally, Joachim 
explains how Judith’s success was based on her masculinization and her chastity. 
Only with these prerequisites could Judith overcome the Assyrians and Holofernes. 
Finally, Jerome and his contemporary Ambrose show their undiluted perceptions 
of widows generally and Judith specifically in their own works. 
Jerome also understands how Judith’s beauty was imperative to both her 
success and her virtue. In various departures from the Septuagint, Jerome carefully 
maintains Judith’s incredible beauty, while also depicting it as a gift from God. As 
a blessing from God, then, her exquisiteness and her plot against Holofernes needed 
to be based upon virtus. God could not bless anything connected to libido, and so 
all notions of seduction needed to be washed from the text. The dress and 
ornamentation from her marriage might even be misconstrued as invoking her 
sexuality, as marriage was the only legitimate outlet for sexuality. Jerome goes as 
far as downplaying Judith’s marriage to Manasses in order to maintain her 
unadulterated beauty. 
That marriage, though, holds a slight use for bolstering Judith’s status. 
Along with her inherited wealth and her irrefutable piety, Judith’s social standing 
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in the Bethulian community looms largely in her story. This standing makes her 
confrontation with the city’s elders possible. Yet, Judith understands her place well. 
Once the threat of annihilation has passed, the Hebrew woman returns to a life of 
domestic cloister. She is not forgotten though. According to Jerome’s translation 
and not the Septuagint, her deeds live on as a holy day amongst the Hebrews. Such 
an honor, outside of someone as accomplished as Judith, befitted only the most holy 
of Christian men and women. While not the strongest point for Judith’s 
Christianization, this conspicuous addition at the close of his translation leaves 
careful readers emphatically and enduringly cognizant of Jerome’s program. 
The story of Judith offers an exemplary picture of virtuous widowhood. 
With an obvious awareness of this fact, Jerome had few qualms about adapting her 
to his personal and institutional agenda. Making decisions that were culturally 
motivated, Jerome depicted Judith in a manner more befitting an increasingly 
Christianized world. Demands for Christian exemplum in that essentially novel 
world also necessitated examples be drawn from many sources, Christian or not. 
For these reasons, Judith may no longer be viewed as she was in the eyes of 
Holofernes, who called her “Hebraea illa.,” or “that Hebrew woman.” Instead, 
Judith may better be thought of as Jerome must have seen her, as Christiana illa.  
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Pleasure in Virtue: The 
Possibility of Willful Virtuous 
Behavior 
 
Kaleb TerBush 
 
Abstract 
 
Virtuous behavior has often been construed as having three requisite elements: right 
action, done for the right reason, and also carried out with the “right feeling,” i.e. 
without the contrary inclination of Aristotle’s merely continent individual. Some 
have argued that even if the right motivating reason(s) for action might not be 
directly within our power to act on at will, there are a number of steps we can take 
in order to make ourselves more responsive to the appropriate reasons – thus giving 
us indirect control over which reasons we take to be compelling. However, I believe 
that such accounts emphasize the importance of right action done for the right 
reason at the expense of giving a complete account of right feeling – and are thus 
incomplete pictures of both virtuous behavior and the way in which it is, to a degree, 
within our control, rather than solely a matter of moral luck. In this paper, I 
elaborate on these views, arguing that if we can control our reasons-responsiveness, 
it follows that we can likewise influence our sensitivity to what we have reason to 
desire. If we can make ourselves responsive to the best reasons in support of what 
we ought to desire, then in doing the right action for the right reason we will 
presumably satisfy a desire of ours, and thus we will take pleasure in acting 
virtuously, without a contrary inclination to do otherwise. And, I think this is true 
regardless of the outcome of debates surrounding the nature of both motivation and 
desires. In this way, then, I argue that the necessary components for virtuous 
behavior – doing the right action, for the right reason, and especially with the right 
feeling – are truly “up to us” in large part, and not merely to chance. 
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1. Moral Luck and the Possibility of Virtuous Behavior 
 
 Discussing moral luck, Thomas Nagel says that: 
 
A person may be greedy, envious, cowardly, cold, ungenerous, unkind, vain, or 
conceited, but behave perfectly by a monumental effort of will. To possess these 
vices is to be unable to help having certain feelings under certain circumstances… 
people are morally condemned for such qualities, and esteemed for others equally 
beyond control of the will: they are assessed for what they are like.  
To Kant this seems incoherent because virtue is enjoined on everyone and 
therefore must in principle be possible for everyone. It may be easier for some than 
for others, but it must be possible to achieve it by making the right choices, against 
whatever temperamental background. One may want to have a generous spirit, or 
regret not having one, but it makes no sense to condemn oneself or anyone else for 
a quality which is not within the control of the will.1 
 
He goes on to point out that Kant’s view “rules out moral judgement of many of the virtues 
and vices,” as these are ostensibly out of our control. However, Nagel believes that such a 
conclusion is “intuitively unacceptable”; even if one becomes convinced that it is 
unjustifiable to judge agents based on virtues and vices supposedly not within their power 
to influence, such evaluative sentiments “reappear involuntarily as soon as the argument is 
over.” 
 Two things become immediately clear from this discussion. The first is that, as I 
believe Nagel rightly points out, we have a natural tendency to praise individuals with 
certain character traits, dispositions, inclinations, and so on, and to blame those with others. 
The second is that it seems to be of the utmost importance, morally-speaking, whether or 
not these characteristics are in any way within our ability to control. Both Nagel and Kant 
seem to believe that they are not, due to certain apparent facts about the nature of both 
moral luck and our moral psychologies; therefore, they think that we must look elsewhere 
than virtue and vice when assigning moral blame or praise.  
On this picture, then, those who possess unvirtuous dispositions, feelings, and 
attitudes – or, vices – are stuck with them, so to speak, and are thus routinely subject to our 
(un)reflective moral blame. While they might be able to overcome said dispositions via a 
“monumental effort of the will” and still act in conformity with what the virtuous individual 
would do, and perhaps even do so for the right reason(s), they still do so in the face of a 
contrary inclination to act otherwise. Per traditional conceptions of virtue, this ultimately 
prohibits them from being considered fully virtuous. Instead, this person is akin to 
Aristotle’s continent individual, whose “rational principle… urges them aright and towards 
the best objects; but there is found in them also another element naturally opposed… which 
fights against and resists that principle.”2 So, the merely continent – and not virtuous – 
                                                          
1 Nagel, Thomas. “Moral Luck.” Mortal Questions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
Print. 32-33. 
2 Aristotle. Nichomacean Ethics. Translated by W.D. Ross, Batoche Books, 1999. Print. 19. 
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person “acts with choice, but not with appetite”;3 they deliberately choose to act in the right 
way for the right reason but fail to actually desire or take pleasure in doing so, instead 
possessing a contrary inclination to act other than the way that they actually are. Thus, they 
lack the right feeling4 generally considered necessary for virtuous behavior.  
So, we can formulate three necessary conditions for fully virtuous behavior: (1) 
doing the right action (2) for the right reason(s) and (3) with the right feeling, i.e. desiring 
to act as such, taking pleasure in doing so, and/or without having a contrary inclination to 
act otherwise. 
At this point I have given a general definition for virtuous action, one that has three 
requisite components. It seems plausible to assume, as I will for the rest of this essay, that 
merely choosing and doing the right action (the one consistent with what virtue requires, 
or what the virtuous individual would do) is something that is directly within our power. 
In that sense, we have the ability, and thus presumably the moral responsibility, to at the 
very least perform virtuous action(s)5 – fulfilling the first necessary condition for virtuous 
behavior. 
But of course, the right action can still be done for the wrong reason. Following 
that, the extent of our abilities is less obvious when it comes to the second necessary 
condition for virtuous behavior – acting on, from, or for the right reason(s), meaning those 
reasons that are appropriate to and consistent with virtue, virtuous behavior, and/or what 
the virtuous individual would do. Consider an example: we ought to help a friend in need 
because we know that beneficence is a virtue (the right, appropriate, or virtuous reason), 
and not because doing so might mean that said friend will owe us a favor in the future (the 
wrong, inappropriate, or unvirtuous reason). Aristotle seems to assume that we are capable 
of controlling our reasons for action, or what reasons we ultimately take to be motivating 
and choose to act on.6 This is exhibited in his discussion of the continent individual, who 
acts rightly merely on the basis of having adequately exercised their “rational principle.” 
As Robert Audi7 has argued, however, it is far from clear that we are actually able to do 
this in such a direct way, as Aristotle assumes. I will turn to this potentially troubling 
possibility, as well as Audi’s discussion of it, in the next section. 
Finally, what about satisfying the third and last necessary condition for virtuous 
behavior – acting with the right feeling, as I have been putting it? Aristotle seems to believe 
                                                          
3 Id. at 37. 
4 I will refer to the complex set of dispositions, inclinations, attitudes, and affective states that 
characterize what Aristotle takes to be constitutive of the virtuous individual simply as possessing 
the right “feeling.” I do so for simplicity’s sake – admittedly, though, potentially missing some of 
the possible complexities involved. 
5 Of course, there are often external constraints on our ability to act in a certain way, including and 
especially in the way that morality mandates. Keeping in mind the “ought-implies-can” principle, I 
will merely be considering cases where there are no such constraints on our ability to act virtuously. 
I will also not be addressing the normative issue of what sort of actions virtue enjoins in this essay. 
6 This is in direct conflict with the Humean view of the relationship between desire, reason, and 
motivation. On such a view, the only real reasons to act are dependent in some way upon the desires 
of the agent. I return to this debate later on. 
7 Audi, Robert. “Moral Virtue and Reasons for Action.” Philosophical Issues, vol. 19, no. 1, 2009, 
pp. 1-20. 
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that adequate reasoning (i.e. seeing what the right reason to act is) and habituation (i.e. 
acting rightly for the right reason consistently and routinely) is sufficient for one to 
eventually take pleasure in acting virtuously, without the contrary inclination or desire that 
would make them merely continent. If what Nagel says is true, however, this right feeling 
requisite for truly virtuous behavior is in fact not directly within our power to regulate due 
to facts about our moral psychologies and/or moral luck that are seemingly beyond our 
control. This would put willfully being virtuous out of our reach. And, this would be true 
no matter how much effort we expend and even if we do the right action(s) for the right 
reason(s). I will return to this worry towards the end of my paper. 
 
2. Reasons-Responsiveness: Influencing Our Sensitivity to Reasons for Action 
 
 Assuming that the capacity to act in some way that we have chosen – namely, to 
do the action consistent with what the virtuous person would do – is within our power, we 
have satisfied the first necessary condition for virtuous behavior. Let us now turn to the 
second condition, which requires that one acts for, on, or is ultimately motivated by the 
right reason(s). On the one hand, philosophers since Aristotle have presupposed that in 
some sense we have the ability to willfully determine what reason(s) to act on. Robert Audi, 
however, has argued that we in fact do not have the ability to exert such direct control over 
our reasons for action – and if that “disturbing… even paradoxical” conclusion is true, then 
virtue is not completely “up to us,” as commonly presupposed.  
Instead, Audi believes that we actually have indirect control over our reasons for 
action. This is because we are able to influence, via a number of means, our responsiveness 
to reasons, including and especially the ones that are consistent with virtue. I will return to 
Audi’s argument explaining why he thinks this but will first draw out the problem a bit 
further. 
Audi uses a number of examples to highlight the disparity that can, and often does, 
arise between what we see as either good or bad reason(s) to act, and which reason(s) we 
are actually inclined, compelled, and ultimately motivated to act upon. He characterizes 
this relationship as follows: 
 
Suppose, for instance, that I am inclined to A [where A is a virtuous action] for a 
bad reason [i.e. one not in line with virtue] but have a good reason [i.e. one in line 
with virtue] to A. If I can bring it about at will [my emphasis] that either (1) I 
believe I should A for the good reason or (2) I want (strongly enough) to A for a 
good reason, I can thereby causing [sic] acting virtuously, i.e. A-for-r, where r is a 
good reason to A and of a kind appropriate to some virtue. This would mean we 
could sometimes act virtuously, and perhaps contribute to becoming virtuous or to 
strengthening our virtuous character if we already have it, just by a kind of mental 
exertion: what some would call a volition.8 
 
In other words, he takes this to be a technical characterization of the sort of capacity 
presupposed in virtue theory since Aristotle: if we adequately understand that some reason 
                                                          
8 Id. at 15. 
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is the one consistent with virtue and thus the one that we ought to act on, then by some 
internal process we can will ourselves, as it were, to actually take said reason to be the 
overridingly motivating one by acting on it. If such a process is possible, he believes, then 
it must be formulated as such. Audi concludes, though, that so characterized “[i]t is 
doubtful that we have the kind of direct voluntary power just illustrated.”9 As he points out, 
the truth of this apparent fact about our moral psychologies worryingly entails that being 
completely virtuous is not attainable solely by some amount of mental effort. Instead, the 
ability to actually take the good reasons to be motivating is merely a matter of our 
happening to have the correct sorts of temperaments, personalities, dispositions, and 
inclinations – in other words, the things constitutive of virtuous character. Audi does 
believe that this claim about our (in)ability to “harness” or “unharness” certain reasons 
voluntarily is true. But he also believes that “how virtuous our actions are… can be very 
largely up to us.”10 How can he possibly hold both of these views? 
 Audi thinks that instead of having direct control over our reasons for action, we 
actually have indirect control over them, via our ability to influence which reasons we are 
sensitive to. He believes that this is possible because he considers our understanding of our 
reasons for action to be beliefs about the grounds supporting doing the action in question. 
Likewise, this entails that influencing our reasons for action involves influencing our 
beliefs about the “grounds supporting the action… [t]his is because what we believe, 
especially in normative matters, tends (if we are rational) to affect our actions, and is (other 
things equal) more likely to do so if vividly in consciousness.” Simply put, Audi takes our 
perception of the motivating strength of a reason for action to be belief(s) about the strength 
of the grounds that support performing the action. So, while we might not be able to directly 
control our reasons for action in the same way that we cannot simply will ourselves to 
believe something, it certainly is the case that we can influence our beliefs by making 
ourselves more responsive to certain justificatory reasons. In the same vein, then, Audi 
believes that we can influence which reasons for action we take to be motivating by making 
ourselves more responsive to the reasons supporting having some belief about the grounds 
supporting doing some action – namely, those good reasons that are consistent with those 
that the virtuous individual would act on. 
Because Audi takes our reasons for action to be beliefs about the grounds we have 
for acting in some way, he also thinks that the methods we use for regulating our beliefs 
are also capable of allowing us to influence our reasons for action. If he is right in this, then 
it seems within our ability to make ourselves more amenable to certain reasons for action, 
ideally making the good reasons for action more forceful and thus overwhelmingly 
motivating to us. And crucially, our ability to indirectly control our reasons for action via 
directly influencing our reasons-responsiveness would put virtue back within our reach. 
This is, again, because virtue requires that we act from, for, or on the right reason(s) – 
something which does now appear to be within our power. For Audi, we merely have to 
fulfill the five “domains of moral responsibility” that he lays out, which are really just 
methods of regulating belief-formation. 
                                                          
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 17-18. 
 
 
 
52 
 
The five domains, per Audi, are as follows.11 The first is the seeking of relevant 
reasons and counter-reasons for action that are “relevant to whatever matter is at hand,” as 
doing so “can give wider scope to nature in regulating conduct and richer content to our 
discourse in explaining or justifying our actions.” The second is the seeking of reflective 
equilibrium, or consistency amongst our set(s) of beliefs. The third is the clear and 
deliberate identification of, emphasis on, and assessment of reasons; in this way, we can 
better understand what beliefs and thus reasons for action we actually have and/or ought to 
have. The fourth is interpersonal comparison of reasons for action so that we can share 
evidence, erase bias, and ultimately have stronger agreement and communication about the 
grounds supporting acting in some way. The fifth and last is both recognizing and removing 
“a degree of motivation disproportional to the [actual] normative strength of our grounds.” 
This is akin to seeing that one holds a belief with “unjustified confidence,” then 
understanding that one ought to not do so. 
I hope the point of this discussion is clear. Recall that the second necessary 
condition for virtuous action requires that it be done for the right reason. Audi argues that 
while we have good reason to think that we do not have direct control over our reasons for 
actions, we luckily seem to be capable of influencing which reasons we find compelling. 
So, although we cannot directly, willfully, and deliberately (un)harness the (in)appropriate 
reasons – those that are (in)consistent with virtue – we can, instead, epistemically conduct 
ourselves in such a way as to make ourselves more responsive and sensitive to, and thus 
more likely to be motivated by, the reasons consistent with virtuous behavior. If what Audi 
has said thus far is correct – which I take it to be and will assume it is for the rest of this 
essay – getting ourselves to be motivated by the right reasons is, albeit indirectly, 
something that we are capable of deliberately doing. 
 
3. Taking Pleasure in Virtuous Action 
 
 Thus far, I take myself to have given a definition of virtuous behavior that lays out 
its three constitutive components. I also hope to have, invoking Audi’s research, shown 
that at this point two out of those three elements are, more or less, within our ability to 
ensure: namely, that both right action and acting for the right reason(s) are “up to us,” rather 
than relegated to the domain of Nagel’s moral luck. So far, then, this at least partially 
preserves the possibility of willful virtuous behavior as traditionally characterized. 
Yet, Audi peculiarly fails to explicitly mention anything regarding how one feels 
when doing the right action for the right reason. But as previously discussed, this is often 
considered the third and last necessary condition for virtue. 
Let me get clearer about how I believe Audi conceives of virtuous behavior. 
Admittedly, he never explicitly defines his conception and only does so “implicitly.”12 In 
his own words, “acting virtuously… is acting on the basis of motivation [sic] and beliefs 
whose content has a sufficiently close relation to the elements essential in the trait 
constituting the virtue in question.” In other words, Audi thinks that virtuous behavior is 
only virtuous insofar as it is rooted in virtuous character. In this way, it looks as if he is 
                                                          
11 Id. at 10-11. 
12 Id. at 5. 
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positing another necessary condition essential to virtuous behavior: that the agent also 
possesses the virtue qua specific character trait, quality, disposition, inclination, etc. 
relevant to the situation, action, and reason(s) at hand. 
However, when requiring that an agent have the relevant virtue necessary for the 
behavior to be considered virtuous, I believe that Audi likely has something in mind akin 
to my conception of right feeling. I think this interpretation of Audi’s view is plausible 
because it seems fair to assume that if an agent has a temperamental propensity to act in a 
certain manner, then they will by definition not have a contrary inclination against acting 
in the way consistent with said disposition. If the disposition is a virtuous one, it follows 
that they will also not have a contrary inclination to act unvirtuously and will thus act 
without the desire to do otherwise, making their behavior fully virtuous. So rather than 
stipulating a fourth necessary condition, I take Audi to actually be offering a different 
formulation of the third necessary condition for virtuous behavior that I have been 
discussing throughout this paper – namely, that the right action done for the right reason 
be performed with the right feeling. 
Returning to the possibility of virtuous behavior, then, if my interpretation of Audi 
is correct, the question now becomes: are our dispositions within our control in a way such 
that we can willfully influence ourselves so as to not have a contrary inclination against 
acting in a way consistent with virtue? Are we able to cultivate within ourselves, despite 
whatever we have or have not been granted by the deliverances of moral luck, the capacity 
to desire to act virtuously and to thus take pleasure in doing so? While the first version of 
the question emphasizes merely not having a contrary inclination and the second actually 
taking pleasure in acting virtuously, I believe that both are accurately captured by the term 
“right feeling.” If one is disposed to act in some way and is able to act in a way consistent 
with that disposition, then by definition one does not have a contrary inclination.13 Suppose 
I have a disposition to act beneficently towards my friends and that I am confronted by a 
situation in which I am able to act in a beneficent manner towards a friend of mine; a 
contrary inclination to act non-beneficently is presumably nowhere to be found, and I will 
also likely take pleasure acting in accordance with my disposition, as it were, by acting in 
a beneficent way.14 
To frame the issue another way: the earlier passage from Nagel suggested that “to 
possess… vices is to be unable to help having certain feelings under certain circumstances” 
                                                          
13 In other words, I believe it would be contradictory to say that an agent can have two concurrent 
but contradictory dispositions; while we certainly can have conflicting reasons for action, it does 
not seem to be the case that we similarly can have contradictory propensities to act in certain ways. 
For example, I might have two different reasons to act beneficently towards a friend – a self-
interested one and an altruistic one, perhaps. However, it does not seem plausible in this case that I 
could have both a disposition to act beneficently towards my friends in conjunction with a 
disposition to not act beneficently towards my friends. In some sense, then, reasons seem specific 
to instances, while dispositions to act in some way are by definition less instance-specific and more 
general in nature. 
14 While we clearly can have dispositions that we do not take pleasure in acting upon, it seems that 
such cases are limited to those dispositions that are already decidedly unvirtuous – because we 
recognize them as such. Conversely, I find it plausible that we take a sort of second-order pleasure 
in acting in consistency only with our dispositions that are virtuous. 
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and that “people are morally condemned for… qualities, and esteemed for other equally 
beyond control of the will: they are assessed for what they are like.”  From this he 
characterizes the Kantian view as saying that “it makes no sense to condemn oneself or 
anyone else for a quality which is not within the control of the will.” In these few phrases, 
there are a number of claims and assumptions about morality and agency that I believe are 
not as obvious as Nagel and Kant take them to be. Specifically, I doubt it really true that 
having a vice is simply being “unable to help having certain feelings” and that certain 
qualities of character are really “beyond control of the will.” I believe, contra Nagel, that 
these things are (to an extent) not beyond control of the will and that further, we are able 
to play an active role in what feelings we have when acting – because of our ability to 
effect which reasons we are responsive to.  
To explain why I think this, we need to return to Audi’s views. I believe they are 
accurate yet incomplete in virtue of not adequately addressing the requirement for virtuous 
behavior that one act with the right feeling. If my interpretation of Audi’s views is correct, 
he only satisfactorily describes the way in which willfully becoming continent – but not 
virtuous! – is within our control. He explains how we can get ourselves to be motivated by 
the right reasons when doing the right action, but says little to nothing about ridding 
ourselves of any contrary inclinations against doing so; he only gestures at the role of 
virtuous character in meeting the requirements for virtuous behavior, which as I have 
argued is plausibly his attempt at discussing the requisite right feeling I am concerned with. 
Thus, I believe Audi has only gotten us two-thirds of the way in justifying the view that 
virtue is “up to us” and not a matter of moral luck. To give a complete account of the way 
in which it is within our ability to deliberately satisfy the three necessary conditions for 
virtuous behavior, one must effectively explain the way in which we can willfully conduct 
ourselves so as to have the right feeling(s), the lack of which prevents Aristotle’s continent 
individual from becoming a truly virtuous one. I now turn to that task. 
 
4. Desiring Virtue 
 
My current aim is to show that we are capable of willfully conducting ourselves 
such that we can have some version and amount of control over our inclinations and 
dispositions – including, importantly, those that are contrary to virtue – in order to show 
that we are capable of intentionally and deliberately doing not just the right action for the 
right reason, but also ensuring we do so with the right feeling requisite for virtuous 
behavior. 
It has traditionally been held by philosophers discussing virtue that routinely acting 
in the right way for the reason is generally sufficient to cause an agent to lose their contrary 
inclinations to act otherwise. For example, in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle 
discusses what he takes to be the necessary role that habit(uation) plays in the cultivation 
and development of virtue. Similarly, Audi briefly mentions that “… as with most kinds of 
virtuous actions, regularly acting generously [or in some other virtuous manner] is likely 
to lead to developing the trait in question….”15 These are empirical claims, but I think it is 
fair to say that they are likely accurate ones. So, if it is true that regularly acting doing the 
                                                          
15 Id. at 5. 
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right action for the right reason will likely lead one to acquire the trait or disposition that 
constitutes having some virtue, then it follows that habituation is the means by which one 
can ultimately behave in a virtuous manner. 
However, Aristotle can be interpreted as simply assuming this to be the case in 
regard to our moral psychologies. Audi also appears to be making a similar move in 
presuming the legitimacy of this method. And although I agree that habituation is likely 
the means by which we develop the dispositions qua virtues of character that allow us to 
act without the contrary inclinations of the merely continent person, in the remainder of 
this essay I would like to give a more fine-grained analysis of just what this process 
involves. Moreover, I want to give such an account whilst keeping in mind that I, along 
with Aristotle and Audi, am arguing that virtue is “up to us” in large part. I want to 
demonstrate that it is within our power to willfully conduct ourselves in such a way so as 
to lose our contrary inclinations against acting virtuously and to consequently take pleasure 
in doing so – in other words, to show that we can largely control our dispositions and thus 
feelings, and consequently satisfy in a very deliberate manner the last necessary condition 
for virtuous behavior by desiring to act as such. Habituation is certainly the crux of not just 
cultivating virtuous action and increasing sensitivity to the right sort of reasons, but also 
(perhaps most importantly) of ridding ourselves of inclinations. However, I also believe 
that there is more to be said about just what occurs during habituation than is discussed by 
Aristotle and Audi. I believe that we have the ability to rid ourselves of contrary 
inclinations against acting virtuously. But just why do I think we are capable of doing this 
in a way above and beyond merely acting habitually16 in a certain way for certain reasons? 
 
5. The Cultivation of Virtuous Desires 
 
In the remainder of this essay, I will offer a brief sketch outlining the way in which 
I believe that transitioning from being merely continent to fully virtuous is something that 
is, to an extent, within our power rather than a matter of the moral luck discussed by Nagel 
and Kant. Just like we have control over which actions we choose to do and which reasons 
we are responsive to, I also take it that we likewise have a modicum of control over how 
we feel when doing the right actions for the right reasons. If what I say is correct, then all 
of the necessary components for virtuous behavior are at least partially within our ability 
to willfully influence and ultimately attain if we are purposely aim at doing so – especially 
including the way we feel when acting.  In other words, the potential problem Audi initially 
raised for virtue theory, which I take him to have only partially dissolved, can be adequately 
accounted for. This, in turn, readmits the possibility of virtuous behavior, putting it out of 
the skeptic’s reach and back within our own. What follows is a short argument as to why I 
think this is the case. 
Recall Audi’s view that our understanding of our reasons for action are really just 
                                                          
16 While habituation is a coherent means of actively and willfully cultivating virtue, it does not by 
any means guarantee it; Audi himself notes this. For example, it seems entirely possible that one 
could grow to dislike acting in a certain way the more one does it, and that the strength of one’s 
contrary inclination(s) will increase accordingly. I want to argue, therefore, that there are steps we 
can deliberately take that reduce the likelihood of this decidedly unvirtuous possibility. 
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constituted by our beliefs about the strength of the grounds that support performing some 
action. From this, he argues that via being able to influence our beliefs, we can likewise 
influence our responsiveness to certain reasons, namely the right or appropriate ones that 
are consistent with acting virtuously. In this way, we have indirect control over what 
reasons we ultimately take to be motivating. We cannot at will choose to act on a reason, 
even if we know it is the one that we ought to be acting on; however, there are certain 
epistemic procedures we can routinely practice so as to make ourselves more responsive to 
the reasons that we really ought to be acting on. 
So, per Audi let us grant that we can influence both which reasons we are 
responsive to and, because of that fact, what we believe. Broadly speaking, like Aristotle’s 
continent individual we can presumably use our “rational principle” to see what action(s) 
virtue requires of us, as well as what the virtuous reason for doing said action is. By 
understanding those facts and then fulfilling some or all of Audi’s five domains of moral 
responsibility qua epistemic practices, we can make the right reason(s) actually motivating 
to or for us. But again, what about how we feel when acting in accordance with virtue by 
doing the right actions for the right reasons(s)? If we act whilst still feeling a contrary 
“appetite,” or inclination, then we are merely continent and not truly virtuous. If Audi’s 
account is correct, we can see what the good, right, and appropriate reasons for action are 
and make ourselves more sensitive to and motivated by those reasons that are consistent 
with virtue. However, his views, while accurate as they stand, are incomplete because they 
only demonstrate the possibility of willful continence, and not willful virtue.  
Building on Audi’s analysis, though, I believe that it follows from his discussion 
of our ability to influence our reasons-responsiveness that the right feeling requisite for 
behavior to meet the criteria for being virtuous is something that we can willfully cultivate, 
because of the relationship between reasons, beliefs, and desires.  
My central point is that, similarly to the way in which we can apparently influence 
our receptivity to reasons for belief and action, we can therefore: see what we have reason 
to desire, including and especially per the dictates of virtue; make ourselves more 
responsive to and motivated by those reasons; instill within ourselves those appropriate, 
virtuous desires; and then, ultimately act in accordance with those desires whilst lacking 
any contrary inclination(s) and thus presumably taking pleasure in doing so. In other words, 
it seems that via our ability to influence our reasons-responsiveness, we can plausibly 
influence our responsiveness to the reasons supporting not just we have reason to do or 
believe but also what we have reason to desire. And if we desire to act in some way for 
some reason, and then actually do act in said way for said reason, we necessarily do so 
without a contrary inclination (because we desire to act in this way rather than another) and 
presumably take pleasure (broadly speaking, desire-satisfaction results in some sort of 
pleasure) in doing so – making the behavior virtuous rather than merely continent. 
Per Audi our comprehension of our reasons for action is constituted by beliefs 
regarding the grounds supporting doing some action, and because we have the ability to 
influence what we believe, we can thus influence our proclivity to be motivated by the right 
reasons – not just those supporting certain beliefs and actions, but also desires. Further, I 
take there to be a parallel between beliefs and desires in the sense that they are both 
intentional states – we believe something, just as we desire something. In this way, if 
something is true about beliefs, then in a general sense it is prima facie plausible to think 
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that that same thing holds regarding desires as well. And, one thing that seems true about 
our beliefs is that they are informed by reasons; we often believe what we believe on the 
basis of the strength of the grounds qua reasons in support of believing that thing. Likewise, 
I want to argue as intentional states akin to beliefs, desires are in some sense similarly 
influenced by reason(s). Of course, this prompts the question: are desires directly informed 
by reason(s), or are desires informed by beliefs which are themselves informed by 
reason(s)? This can be respectively formulated in two different ways: one, with desires 
being directly informed by reasons alone, without any mediating beliefs in between; or 
two, with desires being influenced by beliefs and then with desire-informing-beliefs 
themselves informed by reasons. For my purposes, I will leave this as an open question. 
My main claim is that our ability to influence our reasons-responsiveness realistically 
entails that we can influence our desires; because reasons and our sensitivity to them play 
an essential role in each interpretation, I take it to be one of the upshots of my argument 
that it can accommodate both of the above formulations about the relation between reasons, 
beliefs, and desires. 
To summarize, my primary assertion is this: we have the ability to influence our 
reasons-responsiveness such that we can willfully be more sensitive to those reasons that 
are consistent with virtue, and because of this ability we can deliberately influence our 
sensitivity to reasons regarding what we have reason to desire, and thus willfully guide our 
desires themselves (to an extent). In turn, by being able to cultivate within ourselves the 
desire to act in consistency with virtue and in conjunction with then doing the right actions 
for the right reasons, we will likely take pleasure in doing so, without any contrary 
inclinations, ultimately making us fully virtuous rather than merely continent in a way that, 
above and beyond the deliverances of moral luck, is actually “up to us.” And while only a 
preliminary outline, I believe that my view as presented is a plausible one on its face. In 
that spirit, I now turn to and will spend the remainder of this essay responding to two 
preliminary objections. 
 
6. Humean Motivation and Belief-Desire Bootstrapping 
 
 Thus far, I have proposed that we can actively cultivate the appropriate virtuous 
desires that would allow us to satisfy the third and last necessary condition for virtuous 
behavior: taking pleasure in acting virtuously, without a contrary inclination against doing 
so, because we have a desire to act virtuously – or, acting with the right feeling. I have 
argued that this is because, per Audi’s arguments, it seems that even if we cannot willfully 
choose what reasons we act on, we can influence and increase our responsiveness to the 
right reasons, which will then, in turn, cause us to have the appropriate beliefs and desires 
that are requisite for both being motivated by the right reason(s) and for carrying out the 
action with the right feeling. In this way, the satisfaction of all three necessary conditions 
for virtue – including and especially the last one – are within our power, to a degree, to 
actively, willfully, and deliberately cultivate. 
 However, there are two objections that come to mind when considering my 
proposal that our desires and thus the capacity to take pleasure in acting virtuously is 
something that is within our control. The first comes from a set of views regarding the 
relationship between reason, desire, and motivation, taking after Hume’s belief that “reason 
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is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” and arguing that any account – including 
mine – that claims reason can in some way motivate behavior is mistaken from the outset; 
rather, only desires can be motivating, and reason both cannot and should not have any 
prominent role in explaining motivation. The second objection says that just as seeing what 
we have reason to do is often not enough to actually motivate us to act in that way and/or 
on the basis of that reason, merely seeing what we have reason to desire is not sufficient, 
on its own, to actually cause us to have to have that desire. 
 The first objection to my proposal, then, arises out of the Humean view regarding 
motivation.17 I will only briefly describe the view, as my aim is not to refute it but rather 
show how my proposal is entirely consistent with its picture of the relationship between 
reason, desire, and motivation. Briefly put, and substituting Hume’s “passions” for desires, 
the Humean picture is as follows: regarding our practical, means-end reasoning about how 
to act, desires are the only thing able to produce ends, while reason, on the other hand, can 
only produce beliefs. Because of this, desires are the only sort of thing that can be and 
actually are motivating; reason on its own is insufficient to “generate… [the] impulse”18 
necessary for action. A key part of my proposal is that we both can and should use reason, 
via influencing our reasons-responsiveness, to cause ourselves to carry out the right action 
on the basis of the right reason and with the right feeling, the latter of which I argued arises 
from having the right desires. Such a proposal, then, is clearly at odds with Hume’s claim 
that our rationality and actions are beholden to our desires. 
 I believe, however, that my proposal is entirely consistent with the Humean view 
of motivation, and that this is true regardless of whether or not that view is in fact true. 
Recall that I am arguing that because of our ability to play an active part in influencing our 
reasons-responsiveness and thus belief formation, we can make therefore make ourselves 
see what we have reason to desire and actually take those reasons to be compelling, which 
conceivably eventually instills those desires within us. Hume’s view is that only desires 
can be motivating, but it is compatible with such an outlook that our reasons can and do 
inform our desires, as I am claiming. In other words, for Hume using reason to arrive at a 
belief regarding what ends we ought to have is insufficient; we also need to actually desire 
that end in order to be motivated to act in such a way as to attain it. Yet, we often use reason 
to deliberate about what we ought to desire, and it is consequently entirely plausible that 
reasoning about what we ought to desire actually informs what desires we ultimately end 
up possessing. My proposal is that we can make ourselves responsive to the appropriate 
reasons in support of beliefs about what we ought to desire, with the underlying implication 
that we ought to desire to act virtuously.19 That is, we do the epistemic practices that make 
us sensitive to the best reasons; we become sensitive to those reasons, which support having 
some beliefs about what we ought to desire; we then end up with the belief about what we 
                                                          
17 I rely on Amy Schmitter’s interpretation of Hume here. Schmitter, Amy M., "17th and 18th 
Century Theories of Emotions." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2016 Edition, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta. 
18 Id. 
19 That is, I am referencing the widely-held view that the dictates of morality and virtue are in some 
sense reason-granting. While accounts as to the source of that granting of reasons for action and 
belief differ, the stance itself is widely held as a constituent feature of moral discourse. 
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ought to desire; and because we are actually compelled by those reasons, the belief about 
what we ought to desire often results in our actually having that desire.20 And because we 
now actually have the desire to act virtuously, we satisfy the Humean condition requisite 
for actually motivating us to act in that manner. Just as Hume thinks it is impossible to 
even use rationality itself without the prior desire to do so, I hold that it is likewise 
incoherent to think that reason plays no part in informing or creating our desires.21 If the 
Humean view of motivation is true, my proposal can accommodate it; if it is false, then so 
much the better for me. 
 The second objection turns out to be closely related to the first, and I have already 
partially addressed it. It holds that merely seeing what we have reason to desire – in other 
words, having a belief about what we ought to desire – is insufficient on its own to actually 
cause us to have the desire in question. This certainly occurs; we often have beliefs about 
what we ought to desire but fail to have the corresponding desire itself. I believe, though, 
that this is more unlikely and implausible when it comes to matters concerning morality 
and virtue. By definition, ethics deals with agency and normativity – specifically regarding 
what we ought to do, but as I have discussed there is a close relationship in virtue theory 
between what we ought to do and what beliefs and desires we ought to have. Generally 
speaking, I take there to be a common awareness qua belief that morality involves reason-
giving imperatives, and that therefore most people have some sort of a set of beliefs and 
desires regarding what we ought to do – maybe just a belief that there are some things we 
ought to do, and just a desire to do the things that we ought to do. Assuming the truth of 
the objection, it is still plausible that we can bootstrap up, as it were, from those 
aforementioned initial desires and beliefs to arrive at the higher-order beliefs and desires 
necessary for virtue, by using our agential reason-responsiveness-influencing capacities (a 
la Audi) to create these “new” beliefs and desires. In this way, it is not as if the beliefs and 
desires essential for virtue need to be spontaneously generated; rather, they can be 
grounded in broad, general beliefs and desires that we all already have merely in virtue of 
being agents with agency participating in moral practice and discourse. And this is 
                                                          
20 This, of course, is the controversial part of my thesis. I admit that there is likely no necessary 
connection here; there do seem to be cases where we have a belief about what ought to desire without 
actually having the corresponding desire. I do believe, however, that my thesis does generally hold 
in the context of morality generally and specifically virtue. Presumably, if one arrives at the belief 
that one ought to desire to act virtuously, then the aforementioned sort of disjunction will not occur. 
If one is not just aware that it is commonly held that that one ought to desire to act virtuously but 
actually believes that they ought to desire to act virtuously, then I take it to be fair to say that one 
will then actually have that desire. The key elements here are actually having the belief, and the 
parallel that I take there to be between beliefs regarding acting in some way and beliefs regarding 
desiring something; if I have a belief about what I ought to have a belief about, then I almost 
assuredly actually end up having that latter belief – it makes no sense to say that I would not. 
Similarly, if I have a belief about what I ought to desire (namely, acting virtuously), it seems likely 
that I will actually end up with that desire. 
21 While clearly some, perhaps many, of our desires are a-rational or irrational, it is similarly clear 
that many of our desires arise as the result of rational deliberation and/or on the basis of reasons. I 
desire to write and complete this essay because there are many reasons in support of why I ought to 
desire to do so: to get a good grade in my seminar, to think carefully about an interesting 
philosophical topic, to have a potential writing sample for doctoral applications, and so on.  
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precisely what I think is implicitly occurring in both Audi and Hume’s accounts, as for 
morality to even get off the ground, as it were, we have to have certain beliefs and desires, 
as well as the means to rationally navigate them during practical deliberation whilst aiming 
at behaving virtuously. 
 
7. Conclusion: Is Virtue Up to Us? 
 
 In this paper, I wish to have accomplished a number of things. Mainly, I hope to 
have convincingly demonstrated that taking pleasure in virtuous action by desiring to act 
virtuously is something that we can deliberately and willfully cultivate, which would mean 
that virtuous behavior is “up to us,” to an extent, and not purely a matter of moral luck. I 
gave an account of what virtuous behavior is and what it requires: right action, done for 
the right reason, and done with the right feeling. Drawing on Audi’s work, I showed that 
the first two of these three elements is indirectly within our power to ensure. I then argued 
that in the same way we can make ourselves responsive to virtuous reasons for action, we 
can similarly make ourselves more responsive to reasons regarding what we ought to desire 
– namely, to act virtuously. In this way, I concluded that we can conceivably cause 
ourselves to have the desires necessary for one to take pleasure in virtuous action, without 
a contrary inclination to do otherwise that prevents the continent person from being a 
virtuous one. And, I think this is true due to the nature of morality and agency itself, and 
regardless of the outcome of debates surrounding motivation and desires. 
Briefly put, I have argued that the actions, reasons for action, and now desires 
requisite for virtuous behavior are not merely a matter of moral luck and are rather, in large 
part, under our control, if we choose to put in the effort – and of course, we ought to. This 
leads to an affirmative answer to the question posed in the title of this section: virtue is, in 
fact, largely up to us. 
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Subjective Religiosity and 
Organized Religiosity as a 
Predictor of Sexual Affect 
among African Americans 
 
Janelle B. Grant & Kyla Day 
Fletcher 
 
Abstract 
 
Historically, religiosity and attendance at a church with a majority African 
American or Black population was of practical value for African Americans. These 
branches of practicality extended to sexual health, such as delayed sexual 
intercourse and higher instances of using contraception. Overall, however, public 
sexual discourses show some African American communities as “at risk” regarding 
sexual health, which can make an African American individual feel negatively 
about their sexual experiences. The current study aimed to understand how 
subjective religiosity and organized religiosity influenced African Americans to 
experience a positive, negative, or shameful sexual affect. We found that higher 
levels of subjective religiosity, meaning a personal form of religion and not just 
physical attendance at a religious institution, was positively correlated with a 
positive sexual affect among our sample of African Americans (N = 725, r = .11, p 
= .02). Through regression analysis, subjective religiosity was more influential in 
predicting sexual affect than organized religious involvement. The implications 
show that to gain support for sexual decisions and behaviors, African American 
individuals in religious communities will pick and choose what principles remain 
beneficial and applicable from religious teachings and utilize them to form their 
own subjective religiosity that supports their sexual experiences. 
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Religious traditions and beliefs, such as holidays with religious 
backgrounds and the American Pledge of Allegiance, pervade American society, 
but for African Americans, religion is historically of specific personal value. This 
is marked by individual importance, using the church as a place of solace, and the 
creation of a community that endorses common beliefs (Taylor & Chatters, 2010). 
Religiosity is operationalized and will be further defined in two ways: organized 
religiosity and subjective religiosity. Sexual affect, an individual’s feelings about 
their own sexual experience, encompasses those subjective emotions, and it is 
necessary to understand the factors that influence sexual affect, which is what this 
study aims to accomplish. Moreover, it is important to include African Americans 
in research about sexual affect and religiosity because much research portrays 
African Americans to be at a deficit rather than a strength-based position regarding 
sexual health (Fletcher et al., 2015). 
The aim of this research is to identify emotions among African Americans 
about sexuality and sexual decisions concerning religiosity, which can help 
religious communities identify shortcomings and facilitate better support for their 
community members. Subjective emotions regarding personal sexual experiences 
are defined as an individual’s sexual affect. Sexual affect is a factor of emotional 
sexual health. Consequently, African American sexual discourses that are 
influenced by religion have the potential to be a platform to promote a healthy or 
positive sexual affect that will facilitate sexual communication, awareness of 
contraception, and religious community support based on sexual decisions and 
behaviors (Taylor & Chatters, 2010). The current study aims to create a holistic 
picture of sexual health and seeks to give importance to sexual affect as a factor of 
sexual health.  
 
Sexual Health and its Relation to Religiosity 
 
According to the Pew Forum (2018), 79% of African Americans reported 
their belief in God as “absolutely certain” compared with reported numbers of 48% 
White, 25% Latino, and 17% Asian American. Such reported numbers are why 
African Americans are of particular interest for this study. Many times, morals and 
values that are facilitated through religion and spirituality generally have protective 
effects on African Americans as a whole (Gutierrez, Goodwin, Kirkinis, & Mattis, 
2014; Udell, Donenberg, & Emerson, 2011; Wills, Gerrard, Murray, & Brody, 
2003). These protective effects of religiosity and spirituality also extend to aspects 
of sexual health, such as delayed first sexual intercourse and greater self-regulation 
(Vasilenko, Lefkowitz, & Welsh, 2014; Watterson & Giesler, 2012).   
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Organized Religiosity 
 
Diener, Tay, and Myers (2011) found that subjective well-being was 
principally brought about when participants felt social support, respect, and purpose 
from their religious communities. Therefore, if support, respect, and purpose were 
conveyed by organized religiosity, then subjective well-being was facilitated in 
African American religious institutions and attendance was retained. Conversely, 
if support, respect, and purpose were not shown, then African American individuals 
were more likely to leave the institution or practice personal forms of the religion 
outside of the institution (Diener et al., 2011).  
When individuals feel like their sexuality (e.g., gay, lesbian, premarital sex) 
is incongruent with their religious communities, they are more likely to rely on 
personal beliefs instead of religious communities to resolve emotional conflicts. 
(Sherry, Adelman, Whilde, & Quick, 2010; Vasilenko, Lefkowitz, & Welsh, 2014). 
This emotional conflict can cause a negative or shameful sexual affect when a 
religious community does not support or respect an individual’s sexuality or sexual 
behavior. 
 
Subjective Religiosity 
 
Although African Americans repeatedly report a higher level of importance 
of religion than do Caucasians, it does not mean that their church attendance 
follows suit. In fact, Hudson, Purnell, Duncan, and Baker (2015) found no 
significant differences in levels of church attendance among each ethnic group, but 
African Americans still report higher levels of subjective well-being than do 
Caucasians. Therefore, if African Americans choose to take their religion outside 
of the brick and mortar of an institution, they may practice their personal beliefs, 
like accepting homosexuality and premarital sex, instead of traditional institutional 
morals, like exclusively heterosexual relationships and marital sex.  
Placing a larger importance on subjective religiosity instead of organized 
religious involvement does not mean that African Americans do not think about the 
beliefs and religious sexual code of conduct they were taught in a religious 
institution. African Americans who reported having significant involvement in 
church as adolescents still thought about religious beliefs they were taught as they 
grew older (Taylor, Chatters, & Joe, 2011). Often, African Americans report that 
not returning to their religious institutions is to avoid gossip and rejection from their 
religious communities about their sexuality and sexual decisions (Quinn, Dickson-
Gomez, & Kelly, 2016). 
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Religiosity as a Predictor of Sexual Affect 
 
Individuals can experience negative sexual affect because of the 
collaboration of religiosity and sexual decisions. For example, if an individual feels 
as if they are not representing their religion properly on account of their sexual 
choices, they may feel ashamed or guilty about of their sexual experiences (Jardin, 
Sharp, Garey & Zvolensky, 2016). Moore et al.  (2015), explored an African 
American Christian church-based youth group to understand the messages about 
sex the youth were receiving from their parents and church. They found participants 
to be at sexual risk based on their reported sexual behavior. Participants reported 
high levels of organized religiosity (e.g., frequent attendance to church and church 
involvement) and high levels of subjective religiosity (e.g., thinking about God, 
praying outside of church, and reading scriptures outside of church), but about one-
third reported vaginal sex experience at about 14.7 years of age and were 
inconsistent with condom use. While the church spoke against premarital sex and 
deemed it as sinful or wrong, participants felt that the God they ascribed to was 
loving and supportive of their own decision-making; participants felt no reported 
upset about their sexuality and sexual experiences. Therefore, participants’ sexual 
affect was overall positive (Moore et al., 2015). The sexual experiences of the 
participants caused them to personalize and reconcile religious messages they were 
receiving if they differed with those of the church and religious leaders (Moore et 
al., 2015).   
 Higher levels of religiosity delay sexual behavior, but once an individual 
engages in sexual behavior, levels of religiosity might lessen, showing that sexual 
behavior may influence attitudes of religion, not because they chose to stop being 
religious, but because social support is lacking (Vasilenko, Lefkowitz, & Welsh, 
2014).  Using longitudinal data from before first sexual intercourse to after first 
sexual intercourse, Vasilenko et al. (2014) investigated the importance of religion 
(i.e., subjective religiosity) and attendance at religious services (i.e., organized 
religiosity) to determine if there were fluctuations in either of these two facets of 
religiosity. Generally, for both aspects, participants’ religiosity levels did not 
change within 6 months of reported first sexual intercourse, but within a year of 
reported first sexual intercourse, levels of importance and service attendance 
decreased. Participants who continued engaging in sexual behavior inconsistent 
with religious doctrine experienced shameful sexual affect, which caused a 
decrease in service attendance.  
 Many religions speak against premarital sexual behavior and promote 
heterosexual relationships over homosexual relationships (Altemeyer, 2004; 
Barnes & Meyer, 2012; Regnerus, 2007; Sherry et al., 2010; Vasilenko & 
Lefkowitz, 2014).  Today, many people are beginning to accept the idea of sexuality 
being fluid or being able to explore one’s sexual preferences whether it be lesbian, 
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gay, or bisexual. In such cases, their religious identities may be at odds with sexual 
identity (Sherry, Adelman, Whilde, & Quick, 2010). Sherry and colleagues found 
that levels of negative and shameful sexual affect were reported when participants 
self-defined as religious while participating in homosexual behavior. Participants 
who were prepared to explain their sexual experiences to their religious community 
often felt rejection and exclusion from the community (Sherry et al., 2010). An 
African American male participant journaled,  
 
[W]hen I realized that I was ultimately going to fail being heterosexual, and 
sleep with a man, I tried to kill myself by smashing my car into a bridge 
pylon. No one figured it was a suicide attempt I guess because I was let right 
out of the hospital as soon as they decided I didn’t have a concussion. I then 
decided that I could not be homosexual AND Christian, and dropped out of 
all church services (Sherry et al., p. 116, 2010).  
 
A negative or shameful sexual affect can cause a decrease in organized religious 
activity (Barnes & Meyer, 2012; Sherry et al., 2010).  
 A similar study by Quinn, Dickson-Gomez, and Kelly (2016), involving 
African American males who reported homosexual behavior, found that 
participants felt the need to stay physically present in church because of significant 
organized religiosity as a youth. Generally, all participants saw their church as a 
“church family,” recognized homosexuality as being against the beliefs of the 
church, and experienced their sexuality as a topic of gossip at the church (Quinn et 
al., 2016). A participant said, “If God created everyone how they are, perfectly, 
like, he doesn’t make mistakes as people,” (Quinn et al., 2016, p. 533). Participants 
often felt guilt or shame based upon their sexual decisions and sexuality but did not 
want to depart from their church families; therefore, they tailored their religiosity 
to reconcile their sexuality by postulating that their sexuality is not a mistake. 
African American pastors were also interviewed to explain their stance on 
conflicting views of religion and sexuality. A reverend stated,  
 
[A]ll I can say is what the Bible says relative to that lifestyle and the Bible 
refers to it as an abomination. Now, I don’t take that and beat them over the 
head with it. I tell them God loves them. He loves the criminals, the 
murderers, he loves all people. And he can change them (Quinn et al., 2016, 
p. 533). 
   
Religiosity can influence the sexual affect of African Americans because it 
becomes salient when the religious community from which they are conditioned to 
receive love and acceptance is now gossiping, looking down on, and in some cases, 
rejecting them because of their sexual decisions and sexuality.  
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The Current Study 
 
 This correlational study assessed how organized and subjective religiosity 
predicted African American individuals experiencing positive, negative, or 
shameful sexual affect. Previous research has focused on sexual health as 
quantifiable variables like contraception usage, quantity of sexual partners, or 
frequency of STI testing; however, a comprehensive sexual health assessment must 
include subjective emotions. Organized religiosity and subjective religiosity were 
chosen to predict sexual affect because, as an ethnic group, African Americans 
historically and repeatedly report religiosity at increased levels over other ethnic 
groups (Taylor & Chatters, 2010). A sample of self-identified African Americans 
answered a comprehensive survey that included questions about their organized 
religiosity, subjective religiosity, and experiences of positive, negative, and 
shameful sexual affects. The first hypothesis was that higher levels of subjective 
religiosity will be positively correlated with positive sexual affect, but negatively 
correlated with negative and shameful affects. The second hypothesis was that 
organized religiosity would be negatively correlated with positive sexual affect, but 
would be positively correlated with shameful and negative affects. On account of 
the more personal aspect of subjective religiosity, it was hypothesized that 
subjective religiosity would have more influence on sexual affect than organized 
religiosity. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
 Participants were recruited from a large Midwestern university. Participants 
were contacted through introductory psychology courses and African American 
and Hispanic/Latino students were directly recruited from the campus registrar 
during 2005 to 2010. The ethnic representation of the university population at the 
time was 65% European American, 12.1% Asian American, 5.8% African 
American, and 4.1% Hispanic American. From the larger sample, 725 participants 
reported to be African American with 72.8% females and 27.2% males. The 
participants ranged from ages 18 to 24 years (M = 19.95, SD = 1.31). All were 
undergraduate students, and class year was not collected. From the larger sample, 
80.7% reported to be exclusively heterosexual, 1.3% reported exclusively 
homosexual behavior, and 1% reported some homosexual behavior. Some 
participants declined to report sexual orientation. 
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Measures 
 
Sexual affect.  This measure assessed experiences of sexual affect or 
emotions in regards to their own sexual experiences. This included 16 adjectives to 
describe sexual affect (e.g. satisfied, frustrated, ashamed). Participants indicated 
their levels of emotion experienced about their current sexual experiences and 
behaviors on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0= “not at all” to 4= “a lot.” A 
principle component factor analysis (utilizing Oblimin rotation) showed a 3-factor 
structure. Then reliability analyses were conducted to corroborate the three 
subscales: positive (α = .91; 6 items; “satisfied”), negative (α = .85; 5 items, 
“frustrated”), and shame (α = .78; 3 items, “ashamed”). Reported higher scores 
showed that the affect was experienced concerning their own sexuality and sexual 
behavior.  
 
Religiosity and Spirituality. The Religiosity and Spirituality measure 
(Mattis, Hearn, & Jagers, 2002) was intended to assess participants’ attitudes 
towards religion, personal involvement, and how they felt about religion as children 
which was interpreted by four subscales. For this study, the two subscales or 
Subjective Religiosity and Organizational Religious Involvement were utilized. 
Pertaining to subjective religiosity, participants selected the response that best 
related with their feelings and beliefs about religiosity and spirituality on a 5-point 
Likert scale 1= “not at all important” to 5= “very important” regarding their 
subjective religiosity (α = .89; 4 items; “how important is religion in your life 
today?”) to understand how they felt about using religion in their daily lives. Higher 
scores indicated that participants found religion to be important an important aspect 
in their lives—from daily prayer to reading Scriptures, all of these activities were 
done on their own accord outside of an institution.  
To measure participants’ organizational religious involvement (α = .74; 9 
items), they circled “yes” or “no” to questions such as, “are you are member of a 
church or religious institution” and “do you presently hold a leadership role in a 
religious institution?” A mean of the number of “yes” responses was created to rate 
organizational involvement, which could have included having a leadership role in 
the religious institution, regularly attendance weekly, or involvement in a religious 
group (that may not be an institution, but a group with a common religious aspect).  
 
Procedure 
 
 The data were taken from a larger ongoing study on positive sex and gender 
socialization in undergraduates. Approval for the study was obtained from the 
Institutional Review Board at the university of its origin. The participant’s grade 
was contingent upon completion of the study, but there was an alternative writing 
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option for those who chose to not participate. Data were collected from 2005 to 
2010 during each academic semester and successfully received a large portion of 
African American participants, though all non-Caucasian students were encouraged 
to participate.  
The duration of each session lasted approximately 45 minutes to one hour, 
with five to 10 participants per session. Participants were informed that they could 
ask questions or skip any question that they did not want to answer. After indicating 
willingness to participate on consent forms, they were given questionnaire packets. 
Then a debriefing form was given to each participant giving information about the 
study and the questions they had answered. 
 
Results 
 
Overview of Plan of Analysis 
 
Descriptive analyses were completed to evaluate the means of continuous 
variables and frequencies of categorical variables. Then inferential statistics were 
conducted to test hypotheses. Analyses focused on participants’ sexual affect in 
regards to their levels of subjective religiosity and organized religion. Utilizing 
correlational analyses, relationships between sexual affect (positive, negative, and 
shameful) and religiosity (subjective and organized) were investigated. By 
conducting Pearson correlations, to note if positive, negative, or shameful sexual 
affect was related with either or both subjective and organized religiosity, none of 
the sentiments regarding sexual affect were significantly correlated with organized 
religiosity (Table 1). After finding significance between the positive and negative 
sexual affects and subjective religiosity, a regression model was created to better 
understand what influenced the positive and negative sexual affects (Table 2).  
 
Characteristics of Sample 
 
Through descriptive analysis, it was found that the sample of African 
Americans was highly religious. Notably, 74% of participants reported some type 
of subjective religiosity and 71% reported some type of organized religiosity. Table 
1 shows demographic sexual factors that influenced sexual affect in this sample 
were age in years at first sexual experience (N = 14.1), if contraception was used at 
last intercourse, and ties to ethnic identity.  
 
  Subjective Religiosity and Sexual Affect 
 
It was hypothesized that higher levels of subjective religiosity would be 
positively correlated with a higher positive sexual affect but would be negatively 
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correlated with shameful and negative affects. Thus, subjective religiosity was a 
predictor of positive sexual affect. As can be seen in Table 2, Pearson correlations 
indicated that a positive sexual affect is positively correlated with higher levels of 
subjective religiosity (r  = .11, p  = .02). Additionally, subjective religiosity is 
negatively correlated with negative sexual affect (r  = -.11, p  = .02),partially 
supporting hypothesis 1. Although subjective religiosity had significant 
correlations with positive and negative sexual affects, there was no significant 
correlation between subjective religiosity and a shameful sexual affect.  
 
Organized Religiosity and Sexual Affect 
 
It was hypothesized that organized religiosity would be negatively 
correlated with positive sexual affect and would be positively correlated with 
shameful and negative sexual affects. The second hypothesis was not supported. 
Therefore, organized religiosity was not a predictor of shameful or negative sexual 
affects. Table 2 depicts that no significant correlations were present. 
 
Demographic Factors that Influence Sexual Affect 
 
 Because subjective religiosity has a more personal aspect than organized 
religiosity, it was hypothesized that subjective religiosity would be more influential 
in determining positive and negative sexual affects than organized religiosity. Table 
2 shows that organized religiosity had no significant correlation with sexual affect; 
therefore, organized religiosity was not included in the regression analysis model, 
and the third hypothesis of subjective religiosity being more predictive than 
organized religiosity was supported. To further understand what influenced sexual 
affect among the sample, a regression model was created including demographic 
factors that were significantly correlated with positive, negative, or shameful sexual 
affect (Table 1).  
Table 3 shows the results of a regression analysis model to address this 
hypothesis. The Pearson correlation also indicates other factors that influence 
sexual affect. (e.g., age of first intercourse, ethnic identity, reported levels of 
depression, and subjective religiosity). 
 Again, there were no significance in any correlations with organized 
religiosity, so it was not included in the regression analysis model since it does not 
have any influence or predictive value in this sample’s sexual affect. Other than 
subjective religiosity, ethnic identity, age of first sexual experience, experience of 
depression, and the use of contraception at last sexual encounter were significant 
correlations that were controlled for in the model. Overall, controlling for 4 sexual 
factors contributed an additional .54% to 1.2% of variance for positive sexual affect 
and .50 to 1.19% of variance for negative sexual affect. 
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Table 1. Bivariate Correlations Between Demographic Variable to Predict Positive 
and Negative Sexual Affect. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Age at first sexual 
experience 
-- .06 .11* .03 .08 -
.27** 
.12 
2 Subjective Religiosity  -- .07 .12* .24*
* 
-.11* .11* 
3 Used contraception at 
last intercourse 
  -- .09 .04 .05 -
.17** 
4 Ethnic identity    -- .12* .23** -
.17** 
5 Reported depression     -- -.31* .42** 
6 Positive Sexual Affect      -- -
.17** 
7 Negative Sexual Affect       -- 
**Correlation is significant at the p<0.01 level 
*Correlation is significant at the p<0.05 level 
 
Table 2. Bivariate Correlations Between Subjective Religiosity, Organized 
Religiosity Negative Sexual Affect, Shameful Sexual Affect, and Positive Sexual 
Affect. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 Negative Sexual Affect -- .67* -.45** -.11* -.04 
2 Shameful Sexual Affect  -- -.51** .00 .08 
3 Positive Sexual Affect   -- .11* .06 
4 Subjective Religiosity    -- .60** 
5 Organized Religiosity     -- 
**Correlation is significant at the p<0.01 level 
*Correlation is significant at the p<0.05 level 
 
Table 3. Regression Analyses Predicting which Factors are Most Influential in 
Predicting Positive and Negative Sexual Affects. 
 Positive Sexual Affect Negative Sexual Affect 
Age at first sexual 
experience 
-.27** .12 
Subjective religiosity .11* -.11* 
Used contraception at 
last intercourse 
.05 -.17** 
Ethnic identity .23** -.16** 
Reported depression .31** .42** 
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Table 3. (Continued) 
**Correlation is significant at the p<0.01 level 
*Correlation is significant at the p<0.05 level 
 
Discussion 
 
 This study sought to investigate the role of organized religiosity and 
subjective religiosity in predicting emotions about sexual experiences among 
African Americans. In particular, organized religiosity focused on the element of 
frequency of attendance to religious services and regular involvement with 
religious extracurricular activities, but subjective religiosity was focused on taking 
the elements learned during attendance to religious services and activities and using 
the morals learned outside of the church walls for personal growth, gain, and 
sustainability. In other words, subjective religiosity is how an individual chooses to 
implement religion during their daily lives without formally or physically going to 
church.  
As expected, it was found that participants who practiced subjective 
religiosity felt positively about their sexual experiences. But, most surprising was 
that organized religiosity had a negligible role in predicting sexual affect in this 
sample, even though much of the existing literature suggested that organized 
religiosity can be a reoccurring factor for African Americans experiencing negative 
or shameful sentiments about their sexual experiences. If participants had their first 
sexual experience at a younger age, their sexual affect was usually negative. On the 
other hand, if reported contraception was used during last intercourse and if 
participants had a strong sense of ethnic identity, their sexual affect was usually 
positive. 
 
Subjective Religiosity as a Predictor of Positive Sexual Affect 
 
A common theme from our analyses was, like historical evidence shows, 
that African Americans in our study found religion to be important for daily life. 
Many implemented regular prayer and Scripture readings on their own accord. This 
one-on-one time spent forging a relationship with the deity to whom they worship 
could have resulted in validating and feeling confident about their sexual 
experiences. Subjective religiosity predicted positive emotions concerning sexual 
experiences, which is positive sexual affect. If there were negative emotions felt 
about their sexual experiences, it was useful to combat negative emotions about 
sexual experiences with the principles of subjective religiosity.  
 
Adjusted R2 .054 .118 
F 1.444* 2.033** 
 
 
 
72 
 
Organized Religiosity and Sexual Affect  
 
A possible explanation for subjective religiosity, rather than organized 
religiosity, being a predictive factor of sexual affect in this sample is that sexual 
experiences and subjective religiosity both involve personal decision-making. For 
example, if a religious African American individual decides to engage in 
homosexual behavior, they can internally validate the sexual behavior through 
subjective religiosity. The individual can decide that, personally, their religion does 
not hinder them from pursuing these sexual experiences. 
   
Limitations and Further Implications 
 
Although our findings presented essential steps to understanding what 
religious aspects can help facilitate positive emotions about sexual experiences in 
the African American community, there are some limitations that contextualize our 
results. First, we did not examine what religious messages participants were 
receiving from religious institutions. Second, our sample was predominately 
females, so it is unclear how applicable our results are to African American males. 
For future research, it would be useful to understand what facets of subjective 
religiosity (e.g., prayer, personal reconciliation, Scripture reading) are helpful in 
predicting positive sexual affect. Although subjective religiosity was more 
predictive of sexual affect, it remains imperative to understand the effects that 
predominately African American religious institutions have on the community in 
generating sexual affect.  
As a way to shift previous research from sexual health research that tends 
to focus on the many sexual risk factors that African Americans face, it is crucial 
to apply religiosity, which is historically advantageous for African Americans, 
making it a suitable factor for predicting positive sexual affect, which in return 
might facilitate holistic sexual health. When, as a community, African Americans 
are encouraged to feel positive about their unique sexual experiences, a comfortable 
culture in speaking positively about sex and sexuality is created.  
Religious institutions that are predominately African American can be a 
practical community starting point to begin positive socialization about sex and 
sexuality. Socializing or speaking positively about sex and sexuality means that an 
individual is able to be assertive about protected sex, express what is needed to feel 
comfortable in a sexual situation, and clearly convey unwanted sexual experiences 
(Hobern, 2014). Nurturing positive feelings about sexual experiences within 
African American religious communities through acceptance and honest 
communication can place African Americans at an advantage for achieving greater 
holistic sexual health.  
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Quiet: The Power of Introverts in 
a World That Can't Stop Talking: 
A Book Analysis 
 
Molly Goaley 
 
Abstract 
 
The topics addressed in Susan Cain’s Quiet are important to nonscholarly and 
academic audiences because introversion is a universal personality trait that affects 
us all in some way. If we are not introverts ourselves, we have colleagues, 
supervisors, family members, friends or children who are. Studies of extroversion 
and introversion in organizational teamwork (Zanin & Bisel, 2018), office 
environments (McElroy & Morrow, 2010), and leadership (Grant et al., 2011) 
therefore have practical implications regardless of personality type. The purpose of 
this paper is to compare and contrast Cain’s work with the existing scholarly 
research in order to gain a deeper understanding of introversion’s role in the 
workplace, as well as identify limitations in the research literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
Introverts living under the Extrovert Ideal are like women in a man’s world, 
discounted because of a trait that goes to the core of who they are. 
Extroversion is an enormously appealing personality style, but we’ve turned 
it into an oppressive standard to which most of us feel we must conform 
(Cain, 2012, p. 4).  
 
These are the sentences that introduce Susan Cain’s (2012) passionately 
argued and expertly researched book, Quiet: The Power of Introverts in a World 
That Can’t Stop Talking. At least one third of the people we know are introverts: 
those who listen intently (Grant, Gino & Hofmann, 2011) and concentrate best in 
quiet spaces (McElroy & Morrow, 2010), who prefer working individually more 
than on teams (Henningsen & Henningsen, 2018), and who dislike self-promotion 
and attention (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009) but thrive on focused conversations. Cain 
argues that we dramatically undervalue this creative, self-motivated personality 
type (Hazel, Keaten & Kelly, 2014) and that we lose much in our organizations by 
doing so. Even in less obvious introverted occupations like law, politics and 
activism, she argues that some of the biggest leaps forward were made by people 
who “achieved what they did, not in spite of, but because of their introversion” 
(Cain, 2012, p. 6).  
Cain addresses the rise of what she calls the Extrovert Ideal, or the 
omnipresent belief that the ideal self is gregarious, alpha and comfortable being the 
center of attention. She explains that our cultural focus on extroversion permeates 
our organizations to the point that introversion has become a second-class 
personality trait, “somewhere between a disappointment and a pathology” (Cain, 
2012, p. 4). To embrace the Extrovert Ideal so unthinkingly is a costly mistake, as 
we miss out on the significant contributions that come from introverts who create 
and innovate by tapping into their inner worlds. The “New Groupthink” structure, 
or the idea that teamwork should be elevated above all else, stifles productivity for 
those who need solitude to get the real work done (Cain, 2012, p. 75). Additionally, 
failure to recognize the potential of introverts in leadership roles is a major 
disservice to organizations, as less extroverted leaders are more apt to listen to 
employees’ ideas and consider their opinions in decision-making (Grant et al., 
2011).   
The topics addressed in Quiet are important to nonscholarly and academic 
audiences because introversion is a universal personality trait that affects us all in 
some way. If we are not introverts ourselves, we have colleagues, supervisors, 
family members, friends or children who are. Studies of extroversion and 
introversion in organizational teamwork (Zanin & Bisel, 2018), office 
environments (McElroy & Morrow, 2010), and leadership (Grant et al., 2011) 
therefore have practical implications regardless of personality type. The purpose of 
this paper is to compare and contrast Cain’s work with the existing scholarly 
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research in order to gain a deeper understanding of introversion’s role in the 
workplace, as well as identify limitations in the research literature. I will focus on 
Quiet’s concepts of teamwork, leadership, communication styles and physical 
environments by providing a literature review regarding introversion in 
organizational communication and conclude with an evaluation and critique of the 
book.  
 
Author and Book 
 
Author Biographical Sketch 
 
Susan Cain is a self-described introvert who brings a wealth of personal and 
professional experience to Quiet. She is the chief revolutionary behind Quiet 
Revolution and the author of two bestsellers, Quiet: The Power of Introverts in a 
World That Can’t Stop Talking and Quiet Power: The Secret Strengths of 
Introverts.  
A former Wall Street lawyer, Cain was inspired to write Quiet after noticing 
the vast amounts of untapped potential that existed in personality types like hers in 
the workplace. For Cain, Quiet is not just a book but a mission to change how we 
think about introversion; to reshape workplace culture and design; and to steer away 
from groupthink in favor of environments that support deep reflection and focus. 
In addition to writing, Cain is now a public speaker on the topic of introversion and 
her record-breaking TED Talk has been viewed more than 19 million times (Cain, 
2012).  
Cain is influenced by the idea that introverts are constantly being forced to 
engage in practices that go against their innate nature and have been doing so their 
whole lives. She is particularly interested in empowering introverted children, as 
well as educating parents and teachers about their unique needs. She deliberately 
uses “introversion” as a broad term, drawing insight from Big Five psychology, 
Carl Jung, Jerome Kagan, Elaine Aron, and many other scholars and researchers 
(Cain, 2012, p. 269-270).  
 
Book Summary 
 
Quiet is written in a style that appeals to readers of all types, is thoroughly 
supported by research, and offers many true stories of unforgettable introverts like 
Rosa Parks, Warren Buffett, and Steve Wozniak. The book’s main arguments focus 
on the following ideas: that much of the world embraces the Extrovert Ideal and 
thus undervalues introversion, and that today’s schools and organizations neglect 
to provide an environment in which introverts can thrive and produce their best 
work.  
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Quiet is broken into four parts based on the following concepts: the 
Extrovert Ideal, biology as it relates to temperament, introversion as it relates to 
culture, and introversion as it relates to communication and relationships. 
Part One explores how extroversion rose to become the cultural ideal, as 
well as the history and shortcomings of charismatic leadership. As American 
culture increasingly came to idolize the Cult of Personality over time, biases toward 
extroversion intensified. Early citizens of our country depended on our founding 
fathers to be “loudmouths” about liberty, while qualities of the more reserved were 
regarded with a growing disdain (Cain, 2012, p. 30). As a culture, we have been 
taught to idolize the charismatic, while qualities of introversion (e.g., being soft-
spoken or contemplative) have traditionally been viewed as weaknesses. This 
section concludes with a critique of what Cain calls the “New Groupthink,” the idea 
that our best and most creative work comes solely from collaboration (Cain, 2012, 
p. 75). Cain adamantly makes the point that for at least one third of the population 
(introverts), solitude is a vital key to creativity. While school systems and 
organizations should be teaching people to work independently and providing 
plenty of space for solitude, they increasingly do the opposite. Moreover, when 
organizations force members to participate in groupthink and teamwork above all 
else, it consequentially stifles productivity and intellectual achievement for many 
(Cain, 2012). 
Part Two transitions into biology’s role in temperament and how free will 
can be channeled into making the naturally introverted more comfortable in 
communicating. Cain explores developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan’s work 
regarding high and low reactivity in infants, which provides a tremendous amount 
of evidence that high reactivity is one biological basis of introversion (Cain, 2012). 
The temperament we are born with, Cain concludes, mixed with cultural and life 
experience, forms our individual personality and our likeliness to be introverted or 
extroverted.  
Part Three explores Cain’s concept of “soft power” in the context of Asian-
Americans navigating the Extrovert Ideal, and how culture plays a role in the way 
we perceive personality type. Without encouraging rigid national or ethnic 
stereotyping, Cain acknowledges the cultural differences in personality between 
East and West, and how qualities of introversion are often revered in Asian 
countries (Cain, 2012). 
Part Four concludes the book by offering advice to introverts on when to 
act more extroverted, how to address the communication gap between the opposite 
types, and perhaps most importantly, how to empower quiet children. Introverted 
youth, she argues, are typically encouraged by well-meaning parents and teachers 
to act against their nature in social situations. By allowing quiet children to be 
themselves, however, we empower them with the confidence necessary to navigate 
the world in meaningful ways (Cain, 2012) 
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Quiet is heavily researched, with Cain citing 271 total sources in the notes 
section of the book. She supports her conclusions with a plethora of academic 
literature in psychology, sociology, and communication. In addition, she offers 
many anecdotal stories from popular biographies and autobiographies on introverts 
such as Warren Buffett, Eleanor Roosevelt, Mahatma Gandhi, Bill Gates, and 
others.  
 
Literature Review and Evaluation 
 
Though Quiet explores introversion mainly through the lenses of 
psychological and social sciences, the book’s concepts go hand-in-hand with 
organizational communication. The following section will focus on relevant and 
contemporary research related to these concepts and will compare and contrast the 
literature to Cain’s work.  
 
Major Concepts 
 
Teamwork, leadership, communication style, and environment are main 
concepts found within contemporary research related to introversion in 
organizational communication. 
Teamwork (e.g., group work, brainstorming) is based on the idea that 
collective action and thought processing are more effective and efficient than 
individual thought and action. Additionally, as dependence on teams has increased 
in organizations, research has begun to examine the role of leadership in fostering 
team success (Morgeson, DeRue & Karam, 2010). However, extroversion’s role in 
team satisfaction has been found to be insignificant (Medina & Srivastava, 2016). 
Contrarily, despite its widespread use in organizations, social scientific research 
has generally been unsupportive of the claimed benefits of brainstorming 
(Henningsen & Henningsen, 2018). 
It has long been assumed that extroversion and personality trait dominance 
are indicators of effective leadership. While true in some cases, existing literature 
increasingly proves the opposite. Anderson and Kilduff (2009) suggest that 
dominant individuals tend to display competence-related communication cues – 
such as assertiveness, direct eye contact, and expansive posture – regardless of their 
actual level of competence. These cues in turn shape others’ perceptions of the 
dominant individual as self-confident and highly capable of managing tasks, 
therefore allowing the individual to achieve influence over groups. If highly 
dominant individuals are perceived as competent regardless of ability to accomplish 
tasks, this suggests that competent individuals who display low dominance can be 
unjustifiably overlooked for certain positions (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009).   
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The way introverts and extroverts vary in communication style has a strong 
impact on the effectiveness of messaging (O’Carroll, 2015). Within the context of 
organizations, group members’ collective understanding is improved when they 
have similar expectations about the appropriate way to communicate with one 
another (Park, 2008). In turn, group communication research could benefit from 
understanding more introverted qualities of communication style, such as 
politeness and efficiency, and applying them to a group work context (Park, 2008).  
Finally, the environment of an organization has a strong effect on how 
different personality types communicate and accomplish work (Real et al., 2017). 
While organizations increasingly adopt open office structures to reduce costs and 
foster collaboration, employees are affected quite differently depending on a variety 
of factors such as age, espoused values and personality type (McElroy & Morrow, 
2010). While one individual may thrive in an open office environment, another may 
feel constantly distracted and as a result, become ineffective.   
 
Evaluation 
 
Quiet’s main concepts compare well with those found in the research 
literature, especially in terms of undervaluing introversion’s role in the workplace. 
Cain claims that the New Groupthink overstates the value of working in teams 
rather than individually, which is supported by a number of studies. For example, 
Zanin & Bisel (2018) illustrate employees’ need for autonomy, often best achieved 
by working alone, in order to negotiate identity and shape their organizational 
experience. 
Cain emphasizes the power of quiet leadership and how embracing 
introversion’s traits in leadership roles can provide tremendous value to 
organizations. In line with this view, research indicates that less extroverted leaders 
are more apt to listen to employees’ ideas, involve them in decision-making, and 
make them feel like a valued part of the organization (Grant et al., 2011).  Such 
behaviors benefit organizations by empowering employees to be more proactive 
and stake a greater claim in the organization’s success.  
Cain asserts that introverts exhibit a higher level of sensitivity among 
groups, and therefore demonstrate a greater need for deep, one-on-one 
communication style as opposed to group conversation. Similarly, Ervin et al. 
(2017) suggest that task accomplishment is improved when meetings are structured 
by topical expertise rather than letting the most dominant or extroverted 
personalities take the lead. 
Cain consistently emphasizes the need for introverts to have quiet spaces, 
such as closed office structures, in which to be productive. Many studies 
substantiate this claim, indicating that office structure is a key factor in 
accomplishing tasks. For example, McElroy and Morrow’s (2010) study illustrates 
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how employees will have very different reactions to open versus closed office 
structures based on a number of variables (e.g., personality type, age). 
Although the concepts in Quiet align well with the research literature, there 
are also substantial differences that should be addressed. Cain argues the many 
benefits of working individually, yet largely disregards the vast amount of research 
that points to the value of teamwork on organizational outcomes. For example, one 
survey of high-level managers reported that 91 percent of them agreed that teams 
are central to organizational success (Martin & Bal, 2006, as cited in Morgeson et 
al., 2010). This suggests a high level of value in teamwork, regardless of personality 
type. 
Cain’s concept of quiet leadership is indeed an undervalued attribute in 
organizations, yet she fails to address instances of when it is better to have 
extroverted leaders at the helm. For example, Grant et al. (2011) suggest that 
employees who are less proactive respond to and accomplish tasks more efficiently 
under extroverted managers. Communication behavior and style is a major concept 
explored throughout Quiet, however it gives little mention of technology’s role as 
a communication channel and introverts’ level of satisfaction with it. As 
organizations increasingly depend on online communication for both daily 
operations and team projects (Medina & Srivastava, 2016), this area warrants 
further research. 
The final contrast pertains to Cain’s claim that quiet work spaces are a vital 
key to creativity for introverts. However, research has shown that open office 
spaces have been effective in increasing collaboration, employee altruism, and 
company support (McElroy & Morrow, 2010). Quiet makes the case for more 
autonomous work spaces in schools and organizations yet does not address the 
values of open office structures.    
 
Critique 
 
As clearly indicated in Quiet and supported by the research literature, 
society would be wise to tap into the power of introverted personalities. Quiet offers 
an insightful look into the benefits of introversion for both nonacademic and 
academic audiences. 
The layperson will find the concepts in Quiet relatable, as we all have 
colleagues, friends, and loved ones who are introverted and many of us are 
introverts ourselves. Perhaps the largest benefit to the layperson is that the book is 
thoroughly supported by research yet is not bogged down with complicated 
academic language. It is presented in a simple style with many interesting examples 
from real-life introverts. It provides a tremendous amount of insight into how this 
personality type communicates while still being enjoyable to read. 
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A potential weakness is that Quiet sometimes fails to address when it is 
better to lean on extroverted personality types in certain situations. A section on 
extroverted leadership’s role in combat or crisis situations, for example, would add 
value to Cain’s arguments by adding a contrasting perspective.  
A major benefit of Quiet is that it offers insight of this personality type from 
an introvert’s perspective. Remarkably, while a plethora of research is said to exist 
on extroversion and introversion, many of the studies found for this project focused 
primarily on the perspective of extroversion (Hazel et al., 2014). This indicates a 
greater need for more research that specifically examines introversion, which Cain 
does well. A potential weakness is that academics may be frustrated by Cain’s 
failure to acknowledge the benefits of extroversion that abound in scholarly 
research (Grant et al., 2011). While the book’s intentions are to provide insight 
specifically on introversion, Cain’s arguments could be more beneficial if they 
offered a contrasting perspective.   
Overall, I would rate Quiet with four out of five starts and label it a must-
read for anyone who identifies as or knows an introvert (which is everyone). My 
rating is based on how I felt when reading this book. I personally identified and 
agreed with nearly every point that Cain made in her arguments, and came away 
with a better understanding of myself and how to communicate better with others. 
I would absolutely recommend Quiet to my classmates. Not only does it provide a 
wealth of information about people in general, it relates to a multitude of concepts 
we have explored in organizational communication. Managers and employees alike 
could become better communicators simply by understanding the differences 
between introverts and extroverts. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A major takeaway is that Cain clearly points out society’s tendency to 
embrace the Extrovert Ideal and downplay the positive aspects of introversion. 
Remarkably, much of the existing scholarly research also has a tendency to focus 
on the negative or stereotypical aspects of introversion. Dismissing the power of 
introversion so unthinkingly does a major disservice to society. Additionally, there 
is a critical need for schools and organizations to shift toward understanding and 
supporting this personality type through consideration of leadership roles, working 
environments, etc. By letting introverts be themselves instead of pressing them to 
conform to a certain standard, our work lives could be much improved.   
In conclusion, Quiet is a remarkably insightful book that successfully makes 
the case for embracing the power of introversion, especially in organizational 
settings. Thanks to researchers like Cain and others, there has been a recent, 
significant shift in our perception of introverts and their capabilities. However, 
there is still much work to be done in empowering introverts, especially in 
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leadership roles, and allowing them to reach their true potential through embracing 
their unique needs.  
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Andy King and Claire Etty. England and Scotland, 1286-1603. London: Palgrave, 
2016. Pp. ix, 236. $104.00. 
 
 Authors Andy King, lecturer in history at the University of Southampton, 
and Claire Etty, senior assistant researcher at the Oxford English Dictionary, came 
together to write a new book in the ongoing series British History in Perspective. 
Their book, England and Scotland, 1286-1603, acts as an easy to read introduction 
to and current synthesis on the relationship between England and Scotland from 
Alexander III’s death (1286) to the ascension of Scotland’s King James VI to the 
English throne (1603). Through this synthesis, the authors successfully provided an 
introductory text accessible for non-academics and entry-level historians while also 
subtly answering questions concerning the period such as what prevented peace, 
how the relationship influenced each society, and how could a Scottish king rise to 
power on the English throne after 250 years of constant war. 
 The book began with a brief historiographical section that addressed the 
regular English bias due to the availability of extant medieval sources. Following 
that, it traced the trends of the field that culminated in what King and Etty argued 
is the current romanticized idea of the relationship between England and Scotland. 
They explained that this relationship was heavily based on surviving notions from 
the historiographical traditions of both Whiggish and Romantic history. Thus, King 
and Etty, in the writing of this book, attempted to offer a more holistic interpretation 
of medieval relations based on both primary and secondary source material that 
would also appeal to a wide audience. Their hope was to provide the foundation for 
a better understanding of the complexities of the English-Scottish relationship 
throughout history that is not beholden to Scottish nationalism or English 
overlordship but instead is based on an analysis of their relationship with one 
another, as well as with the rest of the world, throughout history. 
 King and Etty defined their book’s scope of time between the death of 
Alexander III, and Britain’s renewed claim to overlordship of Scotland, and the 
ascension of Scotland’s King James VI to the English throne. This selection offers 
over 300 years of relations to explore, all of which led King and Etty to conclude 
that the Anglo-Scottish relationship depended heavily on the Anglo-French 
relationship first and later the French-Hapsburg. Within this frame of reference 
Scotland and England defined themselves socially, politically, and religiously 
depending on the power and relevance of the kingdom of France. Scotland defined 
their relationship with England as one of oppression and unwarranted involvement 
and would take advantage of war between England and France to expand their 
holdings; however, England defined their relationship with Scotland in the context 
of overlordship of Britain and would actively engage in war with Scotland when 
they were not at war with France. These shifting relations enabled Scotland to 
conduct opportunistic raids and prevented England from fully subjugating their 
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northern neighbor. Towards the end of the book, the French relationship was 
redefined as France attempted to impress themselves upon Scottish rule and 
Scotland and England grew closer through their acceptance of Protestantism, which 
culminated in the unchallenged ascension of the king of Scotland to the English 
throne. 
 The book’s chosen timeframe worked perfectly for King and Etty’s 
examination. It excluded the relations before 1286 as Alexander III’s death sparked 
renewed English involvement in Scottish rule, and the timeframe ends with the 
ascension of Scotland’s king to the English throne, an event that shifted the 
interactions between the two kingdoms. The timeframe also allowed King and Etty 
to develop their argument/synthesis in an easy-flowing historical narrative that was 
inviting to those with little to no experience in the field as well as those newly 
established within the field. They complemented this narrative with a thematic 
examination in the second part of their book focused on specific types of interaction 
such as armies and warfare, relations between peoples, and national identity and 
propaganda. These areas provided a more complex look at how England and 
Scotland interacted throughout the chosen years and how the history of their 
interactions both influenced and continue to influence modern England and 
Scotland. 
 In keeping with their easy-to-access approach, King and Etty relied on 
endnotes as opposed to footnotes giving the readers a more uniform structure 
throughout the book. They also provided useful maps and both Scottish and English 
succession charts to help familiarize the reader with the many names and family 
connections. This approach continued into the bibliography and was one of the few 
criticisms of the work. While it was helpful by pointing towards other, more 
specialized secondary works, it would have benefitted greatly from a brief 
discussion or list of the most common primary sources for the benefit of new 
scholars.  
 Overall, King and Etty presented an easy to read history of English-Scottish 
interactions throughout the late Middle Ages. Their book provided not only a 
synthesis of the previous research but also a thematic approach that opened new 
questions and possibilities for research. The book succeeded in examining the 
questions of why peace was unobtainable and how the relationship shifted to allow 
for the king of Scotland to ascend the English throne. It also outlined 
inconsistencies that help further develop the framework for new research into 
medieval border communities, use of the medieval past, and the role of medieval 
Scotland in a global setting. 
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Autumn 
 
Steven J. Maloney 
 
 
Autumn 
 
 
Crossing the bridge from summer to winter 
like some obscure Hokusai, a Keats Ode 
rings in the mists of memory; the road 
not taken beckons, its damp leaves colder 
than before. Musty texts read well again, 
and sweet cooking smells waft through my window, 
bringing a bright moon along now and then, 
(honored guest), while gull anthems presage snow.  
That old saint under the bridge doesn’t seem 
to care he’ll be needing blankets soon; he 
just sits there, paper in hand, glad to see 
the passing show, knowing it’s all a dream. 
Autumn: a return to where we’ve once been, 
a time to ponder the spaces between. 
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Sweet Avaline 
 
Tavia Lloyd 
 
 
Sweet Avaline 
 
 
This world doesn’t deserve you but the earth will preserve your every step 
Every breath in you take will be a breath out of love I’ll leave in the air for you 
To breathe in kindness and taste laughter in the little lungs your chest confides 
 
I will nourish your self-worth and teach you confidence to feel for centuries 
I’ll teach you the beauty of stillness and how colors sound in the night 
I will grow trees of compassion and history for you to read through in its roots 
I’ll play movement for you so you can experience  
the fluid motion of body and mind 
I will bake love and wisdom into foods so divine you’ll crave 
the goodness of soul 
I’ll lift you high in the air to feel raindrop bliss on your plush colored skin 
 
At bedtime I’ll hold you while reading from trees  
of various knowledge and talents that go unseen 
At night I’ll listen to the sound of your slumber  
while I smile in the mist of your wonderous dreams 
 
I’ll teach you the gifts of the earth and the elation  
of hearts beating to the ravine of humility  
I will build curiosity out of the night stars above  
you teaching you the way of constellations 
I’ll show you the bravery and courage of strong people 
someday you might idolize 
People from all nations, all talents, all intellects and feverish might 
 
You’ll teach me to love the simplicity in life  
and the present moment you gift into my sight 
Sweet Avaline, I cannot wait to teach you such marvelous things. 
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Laws of Genetics 
 
Sydney N. Sheltz-Kempf 
 
 
Laws of Genetics 
 
 
My life is a concoction of chromosomes,  
a carefully controlled mishmash of heterochromatin and  
euchromatin intoxicated on a cocktail of power chased with  
genius, declaring I am legally bound by laws  
of genetics which I never had the right to vote on.   
Society feasts on my spaghetti strands of DNA and  
nicknames me Pinocchio while they independently assort  
who I am and what I must be into boxes.  
I settle for an equal segregation of my talents and my dreams 
with no regard for any nurturing that my biological  
mother could have done – but never did.   
Nature is a terrible mother 
but at least she tells me  
exactly who I am.   
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